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1. Total Quality Management/Leadership
Today, forced by the combined pressures of competition
and constrained resources, industry and government
organizations are being pressed to reassess the guality of
their products and services. This pressure to improve
performance is requiring managers to enlarge the scope of
their strategic plans to include goals embodied in the quality
philosophy. In government, the Department of Defense (DoD)
and the Department of the Navy (DoN) are implementing quality
initiatives to increase their own productivity and add value
to the limited and decreasing dollars of the defense budget.
Their initiatives are called Total Quality Management (TQM)
and Total Quality Leadership (TQL) , respectively, and are
essentially synonymous. (I will use the terms interchange-
ably in this document.)
Quality initiatives embrace a philosophy of continuous
improvement in performance at every level and for every
process. To understand the philosophy, it may be easier to
first define what it is not . Simply put, these quality
initiatives are not programs, i.e., a set of specific
procedures developed to address a specifically defined
problem. They are not designed only to regulate guality
within DoD systems or products, nor are they traditional
management technigues (camouflaged by new names) created only
to increase individual or group productivity.
In contrast, these guality philosophies reguire a
broadened focus, the ability to look beyond short-term product
failures to identify the larger wastes in the system that
repeatedly create defective products/services or inhibit
guality goals. The need to discern the nature of the
underlying problems which continuously hinder the guality of
output does not preclude commonly used solutions to guality
problems. It does reguire, however, a steadfast determination
on the part of managers and leaders to solve more than the
piece of the puzzle immediately before them. A memorandum
from the Secretary of Defense describes the TQM approach this
way:
Improvement is directed at satisfying such broad goals as
cost, guality, schedule, and mission need and suitability.
TQM combines fundamental management technigues, existing
improvement efforts, and specialized technical skills
under a rigorous, disciplined structure focused on
continuously improving all DoD processes. It demands
commitment and discipline. It relies on people and
involves everyone. [Carlucci , emphasis added]
In the DoN Executive Steering Group Guidance on Total Quality
Leadership, the Secretary of the Navy summarized TQL in a
similar vein:
TQL is an approach to leading and managing that is guided
by a total view of how all systems of work and people
blend together to meet mission reguirements , and
ultimately perform the service for our country. TQL is a
bottom-line approach to assess and improve continually the
processes by which an organization conducts its business.
Lower operating costs, increased satisfaction on the part
of the customer or end user, increased productivity, and
improved operational readiness will result as guality
improves. [Garrett]
TQM and TQL philosophies require conceptual leaps in
thinking as government managers and military leaders overcome
their habitual concern for end-results and begin to consider
the whole process. Product end-use inspection gradually must
be replaced by system evaluation. Using TQM techniques,
workers are directed to meet internal as well as external
customer objectives, thus improving the process — and
consequently the product — at every level of the
organization. By taking an approach which evaluates the
entire system, industry and government can maximize the value
added by each individual or each process to the development of
the whole product or service which is driven by customer
requirements
.
2. Origins and Principles of TQM
The foundations of quality management theory can be
traced back to the development of statistical process control
(SPC) and the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle of Dr. Walter A.
Shewart, a statistician at Bell Telephone Laboratories in the
early 1920s. Introduced to the U.S. government in the 1930s
and to industry during the Second World War, quality control
and statistical process control were used to evaluate defense
industry products. However the end of the war, the effects of
mass production in U.S. industry, and a captive world market
impeded the continuation of quality management methods by
1949. By that time, "quality management" in America had been
reduced conceptually to mean "final product inspection".
Much of the credit for the development and
proliferation of current quality management techniques belongs
to the Japanese. Their industries had been completely
devastated by WWII. Introduced to quality philosophy and
quality control methods by American thinkers W. Edwards
Deraing, Joseph M. Juran, and Armand V. Feigenbaum in the
1950s, the Japanese immediately began to apply teachings
abandoned by U.S. industry. They focused on the customer's,
not industry's, definition of quality in products and
services. The Japanese learned to apply these principles not
only to the production line, but to all facets of their
industrial organizations. By the mid 1950s, Japan was
beginning to capture world markets.
In this country, pressure to compete with the Japanese
finally has resulted in the reemergence of quality management
techniques in U.S. business and industry. Now Total Quality
Control, the Japanese management philosophy, can be seen in
some form or another in most major, progressive American
businesses. Ford Motor Company, Hewlett-Packard, Cambell Soup
Company, AT&T, General Electric, Monsanto, Westinghouse,
Proctor & Gamble Company and Digital Equipment Corporation are
among the scores of companies who actively have incorporated
total quality concepts into their endeavors
.
[Walton, 1986]
Similar pressure is spreading to the public sector. In
government, TQM is viewed not only in the DoD as important to
improving services, but it also is utilized by the IRS, the
departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, and Energy,
the CIA, GAO, FAA, NASA and within many state and local
governments. [Carr and Littman]
The principles of quality management philosophy are
relatively simple to grasp. However, they significantly
contrast with traditional management philosophy in many ways.
For example, Mary Walton (1986), in The Deminq Management
Method, outlines Deming's "Fourteen Points." These principles
provide the foundation for the DoN's TQL effort today. They
are fairly representative of the change in management thinking
mandated by the quality philosophy:
1. Create constancy of purpose for improvement of product
and service. Business and industry should focus not only on
staying in business, but on expanding their markets as well.
This can only be done by engaging their personnel in research,
innovation, constant improvement, and maintenance to support
common aims/goals.
2. Adopt the new philosophy. Too used to accepting poor
workmanship or performance, U.S. business leaders need to
develop in their organizations a culture where recurring
mistakes are not tolerated and negativism is unacceptable.
3. Cease dependence on mass inspection. Typically a product
is inspected at major stages or in its finished state.
Unnecessary expenses are incurred in correcting or throwing
away the defective products. Quality improvements result not
from inspection of the end-product but from improvement of the
process from which the product is made.
4. End the practice of awarding business contracts on price
tag alone. The lowest price bidder usually gets the job. As
a result, supplies are often of low quality. Rewarding the
bidder with the best quality and working to achieve quality
from a small number of suppliers should be the goal.
5. Japrove constantly and forever the system of product and
service. Improvement is a continuous process. It is the
responsibility of management to model and encourage continuous
efforts to eliminate waste and improve quality.
6. Institute training. Jobs learned in an informal training
environment often lack the complete instruction necessary to
be efficient.
7. Institute leadership. Leadership, not punishment and
directives, is the job of the supervisor. Identifying by
objective methods those in need of help and helping them do a
better job is quality leadership.
8. Drive out fear. Feelings of individual security are
necessary for employee willingness to contribute to process
improvement or question what they do not understand.
9. Break down barriers between staff areas. Teamwork is
essential to the development of any product or service.
Competition between staff areas or incongruent goals hinders
this development.
10. Eliminate slogans, exhortations, and targets for the
workforce. Exhortations do not help people do a better job.
Slogans can be demotivating. Most problems are due to the
system. If slogans are necessary, let employees create their
own.
11. Eliminate numerical quotas. Quotas reflect numbers and
shift the focus from quality or methods to quantity. This
shift easily ignores gross inefficiencies and results in
higher costs. Standards, quotas and goals too often do not
consider system capabilities.
12. Remove barriers to pride of workmanship. People can be
encouraged to produce to the best of their ability. Barriers
such as misguided supervisors, poor equipment, and defective
materials prevent employees from doing the good job that they
desire and of which they are capable.
13. Institute a vigorous program of education and retraining.
Quality cannot be achieved unless both management and the
workforce understand quality methods, tools and techniques
necessary for teamwork.
14. Take action to accomplish the transformation. Total
Quality Management planning and implementation first must be
performed at the top. An understanding of these fourteen
guality concepts by a "critical mass" within the organization
is crucial to successful implementation.
Profound changes in both thinking and institutional
systems undoubtedly will be necessary to support an
organization's transition to guality behavior. The
promulgation of TQM philosophies will redefine values and
beliefs of the workplace culture, affect leadership styles,
and alter formal management processes and organizational
structure. Many of these adjustments will be unwelcomed.
Reforms as comprehensive as these are bound to produce
something common to all change processes — resistance.
B. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. The Objective
This thesis will explore the factors affecting the
acceptance and implementation of TQL change in the military
environment. The goal will be to identify resistance to TQL
change. In doing so, this thesis will provide useful
information to military organizations on existing attitudinal
barriers and technical objections to total guality
initiatives. By understanding the values and beliefs of their
personnel, military leaders will be better able to shape the
introduction of total guality ideas and better facilitate the
transition to total guality processes.
2. The Research Questions
The following
.
specific research questions will be
addressed.
a. Primary Research Question
What is the incidence of resistance to TQL change
among individuals in the military?
b. Secondary Research Questions
- What is the basis for this resistance by rank?
- Are there identifiable patterns of these concerns?
c. Scope, Limitations , and Assumptions
(1) Scope. The focus of this thesis is to identify
where resistance to TQL theory, tools and techniques exists
and to assess the underlying causes of this resistance. This
thesis is not an evaluation of quality theory or methods and
does not advocate a particular approach to implementation.
Neither is it an evaluation of organizational change theories
or change processes. For the benefit of those planning the
transition to a total quality effort, this thesis is an
exploratory study of individuals' resistance to change.
(2) Limitations. Data to support this thesis was
gained from questionnaire responses of students of various
schools at Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Combat
Development Center, Quantico, Virginia. Due to the timing of
the data collection, not all schools necessary to gain
responses from all ranks were in session. Therefore,
conclusions can be drawn only by evaluating those ranks
actually surveyed.
(3) Assumptions . This thesis requires that the
reader possess only a basic understanding of the tenets of
total quality philosophies to understand why organizations may
experience some resistance to TQM at every level. To benefit
the unfamiliar reader, Chapter I of this thesis presents a
brief overview of TQM, its origins, philosophies, and its
implementation history.
d. Literature Review and Methodology
The basis of this thesis is a review of TQM and
change management literature, with an emphasis on the latter.
A survey has been constructed to measure individuals'
commitment to change and resistance to TQL change among
Marines of different demographic characteristics, i.e. ranks,
occupational specialties, staff experiences, etc. The survey
questions pertaining to TQL were based on the methods, tools
and techniques of TQM described in the literature. The
questions then were evaluated by TQM experts in the military
for content and face validity. The questions relating to
resistance to change were based on the literature alone.
e. Organization of Study
As described above, Chapter I traces the genesis of
the quality philosophy and its basic tenets. Chapter II
reflects on the process of change and the nature of resistance
to change theory. It discusses definitions and types of
change, reasons for resistance, and how this resistance
manifests in individual responses to change. This will
provide the foundation for evaluating individuals' resistance
to TQL. Survey and analysis methodology are outlined in
Chapter III; while the survey response data and an analysis of
it are discussed in Chapter IV. Finally, conclusions and




Few people outright resist change or innovation. Rather
they resist or accept change on the basis of its effect on
their individual experience. Individuals may recognize the
merit of a new idea, yet recoil at the adaptation to thinking
or ways of behaving required by the new idea. In short,
resistance may be to the phenomenon of change itself rather
than to the substance of the change.
The implementation of Total Quality Leadership in the
Marine Corps is an example of a long-term organizational
change. Like their counterparts in the American industrial
sector, Marines can be expected to resist to some degree a
comprehensive leadership philosophy that at first glance
appears qualitatively different from the ideals held by
generations of their predecessors. For the Marine Corps to
be successful in its efforts to implement TQL, Marine leaders
must understand the human and organizational predisposition to
resist change in this, or any, change effort. To this end,
this literature review will outline models of change
processes, suggestions for managing the personal and
organizational side of change, and theories of resistance to
change. The chapter then will conclude with reasons why
individuals may resist TQL/TQM in particular.
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A. CHANGE
The reality of today's world, in business, in government,
or in the military is that no one can avoid change. The
dictionary defines change as "the act or process of
substitution, alteration, or variation." It may either be
reactive or planned. Organizational change is any substantive
modification to some part of the organization. [Griff in]
Changes in an organization may be targeted at organizational
tasks, its structure, its technology, or its people. In
addition, changes can be evaluated as technological,
political, or social in nature. [Tichy] Change is
multifaceted and paradoxical.
1 . Forces for Change
Pressures or forces that cause a change may be either
internal or external to the organization. [Griff in] Due to
changing circumstances, an organization may be required to
respond to its environment or outside threat and may have
little choice of whether or not to change. In business, the
effects of economics, maturing industries, technology,
competition for available resources, and changes in laws and
regulations are all external forces that have profound
influences on the way a multinational organization is
structured and does its business. A business may be forced to
change by the external forces created by suppliers, consumer
tastes, federal regulations, stockholders or unions.
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Failure to anticipate or respond to changes in an
organization's environment is a primary reason for many
organizational stresses. After World War II, for example, the
Marine Corps enjoyed high public prestige. At the same time,
however, upper echelon Marine officials were forced to
acknowledge a serious external threat to the Marine Corps'
existence emanating from their "rival" military service.
During the next several years, the Marine Corps endured a
sharp challenge from the Army General Staff, whose objective
since before World War I had been to reduce the Marine Corps
to a minor security and ceremonial unit.[Estes] Fortunately,
the Marine Corps was able to respond successfully to this
external force and drastic organizational change ultimately
was averted.
Internal forces are those forces within an
organization that may demand organizational change. Revisions
of strategy, changes in leadership, the development of new
products or services, or the shift of sociocultural values all
may serve to exert pressure on an organization to respond with
change. Identifying and assessing the strength of internal
forces can make a difference in the managerial choices of not
just whether to change, but also how to change.
The interdependent relationships within and between
external and internal forces make identification of these
forces paramount to developing strategic plans for
organizational change and/or stability. Clearly defined
13
goals, adequate communications, and adaptability within an
organization serve to help leaders and managers successfully
cope with these various sources of pressure for change. They
can also serve to identify the likelihood of resistance to
change and help leaders develop strategies to deal with it.
2. The Change Process
Planned organizational changes can be achieved by
altering an organization's structure, its technology, and/or
its people. By rearranging an organization's internal systems
(such as lines of communication), by altering its processes or
techniques, or perhaps by changing the relationships,
attitudes or roles of organizational members, an organization
can be moved from one state of performance to another. Many
authors have developed models of the change process to help
organizations evaluate themselves and plan their changes.
These models can be generally categorized as theory-based,
consultant-based or practitioner-based. Lewin's Change
Process, Kolb and Frohman's Planning Model, and Beckhard and
Harris' Change Management Model, respectively, are
representative of these categories.
a. Lewin's Change Process
One of the earliest, and certainly one of the most
fundamental, descriptions of the process of change was
developed by Kurt Lewin, an organizational theorist, in 1947.
As depicted in Figure 1, Lewin's view of the change process
14
consisted of three steps: unfreezing present organizational
behavior, moving the behavior (the change), and refreezing the
organization in the changed state. He believed that
successful modification of or within any organization relied
on the leadership's ability to manage the forces involved in




Unfreeze Change \ Refreeze
Figure 1. Lewin's Change Model
Lewin recognized that social and organizational change
was similar to the behavior of charged particles in a magnetic
field — it was the result of a modification of two sets of
opposing forces. The first set of forces were those factors
or sources of power that were driving the change. The second
set of forces were those sources of power that were
restraining the effort to change. If the strength of the
driving forces were equal to the strength of the restraining
forces, "quasi-stationary equilibrium" would occur. In other
words, the current levels of behavior would remain and the
status quo would be maintained. If the strength of the
driving forces became greater than the strength of the
15
restraining forces (by a deliberate effort or by the weakening
of the restraining forces), then change would occur.
Figure 2 represents an example of Lewin's "force
field." In his experiments he looked at changes in the level
of performance by individuals and groups of workers in a
factory setting. A factor is identified as either a driving
or restraining force according to it's relationship between
the individual/group and the task. In Lewin's study, the
factors that represented the driving forces were those
behaviors propelled by a new technology, a new process, a new
organizational structure, etc. Ambition, individual goals, or
personal needs (especially financial needs) were examples.
Factors that represented the restraining forces were reactions
prompted by the change, e.g. individual fears, reference to
group norms to maintain the acceptable group standard of
performance, and loss of individual status. In addition to
these forces, Lewin offered "historical constancy" as a
creator of an additional force field that may limit the amount
of change that actually may be achieved.
Lewin's study demonstrated that an organization's
level of performance could be changed (increased) either by
decreasing the group norms which support current (low) levels
of performance or by increasing pressures to produce at higher
levels. From his observations, Lewin suggested that, of the
two options, the more effective strategy for change was the
one that focused on modifying (weakening or decreasing) those
16
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Figure 2 Force Field Analysis
forces maintaining the status quo. This resulted in less
tension and subsequently less resistance than the strategy of
increasing the driving forces for change.
The success of one strategy over the other in his
research led Lewin to conclude that the process of a change
consists of "transplanting the force field corresponding to an
equilibrium at the beginning level by a force field having an
equilibrium at the desired level." [Lewin, p. 32] This change
in force fields required the three steps identified in
Figure 1 earlier. In the first step, unfreezing , the goal is
the reduction of those forces which maintain an organization's
behavior at the current level. This can be achieved best by
communicating the need for change and providing supporting
information which shows the differences between current
behavior and that which is desired of organizational members.
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In the second step, the shifting or moving of the
organization's behavior to a new level, is achieved through
the development of new behaviors, values, and attitudes.
These are brought about by changes in the organizational
structure and processes. Finally, the organization at its new
level of equilibrium is then stabilized in the third step,
refreezing. Lewin noted, "Since any level is determined by a
force field, permanency implies that the new force field is
made relatively secure against change." [Lewin, p. 35] This is
accomplished through the effective use of supporting
mechanisms, such as organizational culture, norms, policies,
structures and reward systems, and by the removal of
mechanisms that may impede organizational stability.
Lewin 's force field analysis and change model were
simple descriptions of the dynamics of the change process.
His model gave form to the ambiguous forces constantly at work
in a dynamic environment. Lewin' s work is the basis from
which more comprehensive understandings of change evolved.
b. The Planning Model of Change
The Planning Model, which was developed by Lippitt,
Watson, and Westley (1958), expands Lewin 's three steps into
five phases. These phases are:
1) Development of a need for change ( Lewin 's
unfreezing)
,
2) Establishment of a change relationship,
3) Working toward change ( Lewin 's moving),
18
4) Generalization and stabilization of change (Lewin's
refreezing), and
5) Achieving a terminal relationship.
This model is an attempt to delineate the often overlapping
phases of planned change from the perspective of a change
agent, a professional consultant working with members of an
organization.
The Planned Change model was later modified and
refined by Kolb and Frohman for Organizational Development
(OD) use.[Huse and Cummings] Kolb and Frohman articulated two
principles critical to a successful change effort: First,
that "all information must be freely and openly shared between
the organization and the change agent", and second, "that




As identified in Figure 3, planned change involves
a series of seven activities for achieving effective change in
an organization. Briefly described, these are:
1. Scouting. In the first phase, the change agent and the
organization jointly assess the resources available and
explore potential solutions to the organization's problems.
They also discuss the characteristics of the organizational
system that necessitate attracting an outside consultant and
make the organization receptive/unreceptive to change. The
most important result of this preliminary assessment is the
choice of a formal point of entry for the consultant in the
organization's system.
2. Entry. Once the entry point of the consultant has been
determined, a mutual contract defining if and how the
succeeding stages of planned change will be carried out is
negotiated. This is particularly important because it becomes
19
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Figure 3 Kolb and Frohman's Planning Model
not only an agreement of mutual expectations, but also serves
to define the consultant's sources of power for gaining the
influence necessary to work effectively in the organization's
system. This contract later can be renegotiated as the change
process progresses and new information is gathered.
3. Diagnosis. This phase focuses on identification of the
organization's perceived problem, its goals, and the resources
of both parties for improving the situation. In evaluating
the problem, related effects from change in one part of the
system to other parts of the system can be anticipated.
Operationally defining goals helps both the organization and
20
the consultant envision a solution to the problem and helps to
place the problem in the context of the organization's total
development. Finally, evaluation of individual resources
helps both the organization and the consultant determine
whether the organization is committed to the change and if the
consultant is capable of meeting the organization's goals.
4. Planning. The formulation of desired behavioral
objectives and strategies for change are developed here. By
identifying the sources of power as well as organizational
subsystems that will be affected by change, action steps can
be generated that keep the subsystems in harmony and minimize
the possible resistance to change.
5. Action. During this phase, the best change strategy
developed previously will be implemented.
6. Evaluation. An integral part of the change process, this
stage determines if change is meeting the desired objectives.
The results of this stage determine whether the change project
is terminated or returns to the diagnosis or planning stages
for identification of new goals and plans.
7. Termination. One purpose of this phase is to underscore
the fact that the relationship between the consultant and the
organization is terminal. At the conclusion of the previous
six phases, success or failure can be determined. While the
goals outlined in the second, third, and fourth phases may
have been achieved, thus signalling success, complete success
of this process is evaluated on the basis of improvement of
the organization's problem solving ability — a major goal of
the OD effort.
The planning models present a significant departure from
Lewin's change process in that they often introduce the
intervention of an outside agent of change for a behavioral
science perspective. Also, they specifically acknowledge
continuous diagnosis of all internal and external forces that
affect an organization. This diagnosis is achieved through
research and data gathering to ensure that hard evidence
supports opinions and perceptions, and more importantly,
action plans.
21
c. Beckhard and Harris' Change Management Process
While the Planning Model requires the intervention
of an outside consultant, the Change Management Model gives an
organizational leader a framework for bringing about change
from within the organization. Beckhard and Harris introduced
a three-phase model for managing the change process. This
model, depicted in Figure 4, establishes the [framework] for
organizational analysis. It looks first at an organization's
future state, then its present state, and then logically
calculates its transition state. According to Beckhard and
Harris' plan, an organization should first define its goals —
what it wants to look like, function like, or accomplish.
Next it must describe its present situation. The difference
between these two states determines what changes are necessary
and what needs to remain the same in order to reach the future
state. This is the transition state. From analysis of these
states, organizational leaders can start to develop strategies
and action plans and prepare for managing this transition.
Beckhard and Harris do not see the strategies for
achieving the desired change(s) and the management of the
transition state as mirror images. While the first is
concerned with identifying what must be changed (which are the
relevant subsystems that will be affected, what is the
organizational readiness, etc.), the second is concerned with
intervention strategies that will help gain commitment to the
plans being made. Briefly described, these include the
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Why change?
Determining the need for change
Determining the degree of choice
about whether to change
/
Defining the desired
future state :q; Describing thepresent state
i
Getting from here to there:
Assessing the present in
terms of the future to




Figure 4 Beckhard and Harris 7 Change Management Process
following:
Problem Finding — Those concerned with change get
together to identify and clarify all aspects of the
problem. This assumes that the process of clarifying, as
opposed to problem solving or action taking, will be
unthreatening enough to encourage commitment. [Beckhard and
Harris p. 96]
Educational Intervention — In the classroom, all students
are egual during class. They are all there to learn.
Educational activities can help people understand a change
problem and offer needed commitment .[ Beckhard and Harris
p. 98]
Resistance Management — Leaders need to analyze
resistance to change in order to work with it, reduce it,
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and secure the needed commitment from the resistant
party .[ Beckhard and Harris p. 98]
• Role Modeling — Sometimes commitment for change from
below can be achieved only by displays from above. By
demonstrating this commitment in their personal behavior,
norm setters provide role models for other members of the
organization, demonstrating that "this change activity has
priority; it is as relevant as our operating
responsibilities. "[Beckhard and Harris p. 100]
• Changing Rewards — Changing the reward system can be a
powerful way to reinforce a change in priorities. The old
reward system may, in fact, be inconsistent with the new
state of affairs. [Beckhard and Harris p. 101]
• "Forced" Collaboration — Changes often reguire redefining
roles, relationships, and desired behaviors within an
organization. Bringing together the interacting parties
for defining the optimum behavior of each of the roles
allows a low-risk opportunity for cooperation of groups
with vastly different biases toward the change. [Beckhard
and Harris p. 103]
Although this model appears almost as simple as the Lewin
model, the processes involved make it, in fact, very complex.
Similar to the consultant-based models, it reguires a
significant effort on the part of management to accurately
diagnose the organization's weaknesses. The result of this
effort, however, underscores for management the fact that
attainment of priorities and goals means more than using a few
simple levers to bring about change. On the contrary, the
process of change is something to be considered and planned.
Above managing structure, technology, and people, changes in
the environment, in priorities, in relationships and roles,
and in organizational culture must be managed as well.
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d. Comparisons of Change Models
Lewin's change model was the first academic
undertaking which focused on the general process of change.
As a theoretical attempt to describe any type of change, it
lacked the comprehensiveness necessary to prepare
organizations for planning and implementing the often large
scale changes that are necessary to address both internal and
external pressures. Lewin's "unfreezing, moving, and
refreezing" did become, however, the foundation for future
change models that elaborated on these actions with
intervention, diagnosis and evaluation. In contrast with
Lewin, the models that followed recognized the process of
change as happening in overlapping phases, as opposed to
distinct steps. Each phase may not necessarily be complete
before the process of the next one begins.
In terms of time and scope, the consultant-based
models' planning method of change is a longer-term, more
encompassing change approach meant to move the entire
organization to a higher level of functioning. This is done
by greatly improving the performance (and satisfaction) of
organizational members .[ Freeman and Stoner] Although
consultant-based development freguently includes structural
and technological changes, its primary focus is on changing
people and the nature and quality of their working
relationships. It is inherently more complex and consequently
demands the expenditure of more time and money in
25
implementation. Beckhard and Harris' approach is similar in
scope, yet it reminds us that management of change cannot be
confined to a particular action plan for addressing a
particular problem. The change process involves diagnosing
and managing many more affected subsystems.
All three approaches to the process of change
recognize that regardless of the type of change required to
move from one step, phase or state to another, changing
people's attitudes is a formidable task that requires special
attention. The success of a change effort is not only
dependent upon the quality and comprehensiveness of the plan,
but also on the degree of acceptance by those who must
implement the change and live with the results. Failure to
recognize the importance of acceptance often derails many
change efforts. Leaders, therefore, would be well served by
having a better understanding of the process of resistance to
change and what can be done to overcome it.
B. RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
"Resistance" is a common label given to an individual's or
group's negative response to change. We often think of it as
willful opposition to anything new, characterized by employee
stubbornness, aggressive or hostile behavior, and
obstinateness. In effect, we have come to see resistance as
employees "pushing back" against the change or against those
who have introduced the change. Typically, the counter-
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response by management is to add more authority, force or
persuasion to the change effort. Leaders sometimes forget
that they too, at times, are resistors as well as instigators
of change. As Paul Lawrence points out, "We are all involved
on both sides of the process of adjusting to change." Yet
regardless of our responses, changes will and must continually
occur. Change is vital to progress.
How should we handle this change and corresponding
incidents of resistance? Is this resistance justified? Is it
a perpetual task of organizational leadership to force
"change" down the throats of those not willing to accept it
graciously? Is resistance a signal calling for further
investigation by an organization's leadership? To understand
how to best plan change and effectively deal with resistance,
it is necessary to identify the true nature of resistance, the
factors which may influence individual or group resistance to
change, and the strategies which are most successful in
overcoming it.
1. Three Theories on the Nature of Resistance
a. Early Works
The foundation of resistance to change theory is
the classic work of Lester Coch and John R. P. French, Jr.,
"Overcoming Resistance to Change," published in 1948.
Strongly influenced by the works and concepts of Kurt Lewin,
Coch and French sought to identify the reason people resist
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change so strongly and to describe what could be done to
overcome this resistance. At the Harwood Manufacturing
Corporation, where workers' resistance to the necessary
changes in procedures created serious production problems,
Coch and French devised a preliminary theory to account for
this resistance and set up an experiment to test their
hypothesis.
Coch and French evaluated the worker's problems and
attitudes toward change using Lewin's "force field" analysis.
Identifying what Lewin would categorize as the driving and
restraining forces, they noticed that the strength of each
force increased with increases in levels of production. In
other words, as workers became more proficient, these forces
became stronger. The combined strength of these ever-
increasing, opposing forces increased worker frustration.
Further analysis at various production levels showed that "the
motivational forces induced in the individual by a strong sub-
group (their co-workers on the production line) may be more
powerful than those induced by management"
.
[Coch and French,
p. 20] These observations became the basis for Coch and
French's preliminary theory: "Resistance to change is a
combination of an individual reaction to frustration with
strong group induced forces.
"
[Coch and French]
Interpretation of the results of their experiments
led Coch and French to draw a number of conclusions on the
nature of change that supported their theory. First, opposing
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forces lead to resistance as a result of the frustration
caused by the conflict of these competing demands. The
Harwood case showed, for example, that the driving forces
(production goals, pressures induced by the management, and a
group standard of competition) and the restraining forces (the
difficulty of the job, avoidance of strain, and a group
standard to restrict production to a given level) created an
internal conflict that workers responded to by either
aggressive behavior toward each other or by escape (submitting
to the change or guitting). Second, aggressive behavior is
often more a rejection of management induced forces than
resistance to change itself. Induced forces, such as
management pressure to produce more, will propel a person in
the desired direction, only if the induced forces are accepted
by the targeted individual/group. Third, group induced
standards affect recovery from change the most. Deviation by
an individual from the group standard increases the pressure
brought to bear on the group as a whole. This deviation, in
turn, increases group pressure on the individual to conform.
Finally, effective communication of the need for change and
group participation in planning the changes offer the best
strategy for greatly alleviating, if not removing, group
resistance to changes in policies or procedures. [Coch and
French]
29
b. Resistance as a Response to Social Change
Shortly after Coch and French published their
theory on resistance to change and their prescription for
overcoming it, Harriet 0. Ronken and Paul R. Lawrence
completed a study on administering changes in a factory
setting. [Ronken and Lawrence] Although their interest in
resistance was secondary in their research, their observations
led them to very different conclusions about the nature of




Lawrence noted that while two changes may be similar
or identical in their technical aspects, they can be very
different in their social aspects. A technical aspect of a
change would be, for example, the modification of the physical
routines of the job — a transfer to a new line, a new
procedure, etc. A social aspect of a change would be how
those affected by the change presume it will modify their
established relationships in the organization — changes in
status, personal or professional respect, control, etc. In
the individuals studied by Lawrence and Ronken, the technical
aspects of the changes being introduced were very similar.
However, there was a noticeable difference in how the
industrial engineers who introduced the changes communicated
with the operator who would be implementing the change and
experiencing these changes on a social level.
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In the first episode, an industrial engineer
introduced a technical change yet sustained his customary
relationship with the operator, treating her as a person who
possessed valuable skills and knowledge. In this case,
technical change had been introduced, but the social
relationship between the engineer and the operator, as well as
how the operator viewed herself in relation to the
organization, stayed at the same positive level. In the
second episode, a new engineer introduced another technical
change. This time, however, the new engineer treated the
operator in a brusgue manner, leading her to believe that her



































Figure 5 Two contrasting patterns of human behavior
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Figure 5 represents the two contrasting patterns of
human behavior that Lawrence observed. Lawrence believed that
the significantly different results had been determined by how
the customary social relationships had been handled. "The
nature and size of the technical aspects of change," he
concluded, "did not determine the presence or absence of
resistance nearly so much as does the social aspects of
change." [Lawrence, p. 166] Additionally, he believed that,
reevaluated in this light, the studies of Coch and French
tended to confirm his findings. The frustration Coch and
French attributed to the clash of opposing forces resulted
instead, Lawrence believed, because social considerations were
ignored when changes in the workplace were implemented.
c. Resistance as Autopoiesis
A third theory on the nature of resistance is
offered by Jeffrey Goldstein. Rather than defining resistance
as a negative force that must be dealt with before change
successfully can be implemented, he thought resistance should
be viewed in an optimistic light. Applying ideas from
physiology and information theory to individual and
organizational behavior, Goldstein described resistance as a
survival mechanism when change is perceived as an
organizational threat.
Goldstein first introduced the term autopoiesis. This
term actually comes from biology, where it was created to
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explain how a living system survives as an autonomous identity
even though its components are in constant exchange with the
environment. For example, our body is full of eguilibrium
seeking organs (liver) and organizations (glands) that resist
any changes that threaten the body's survival. The
organization of our body allows us to adjust internally to the
outside environment. It also allows us, however, to seek to
limit any changes in the environment that threaten its well-
being. In essence, our bodies are autopoietic because they
resist any changes that may change the internal organization's
ability to function properly and assure our survival.
This term, Goldstein thought, could be applied to a
group of people organized for any purpose. When a social
group is organized in an autopoietic manner, the group has a
self-referential closure and is not adaptive to environmental
changes. When subject to a change effort, an autopoietic
group automatically will resist change. Since the group's
identity is based on a set of fixed assumptions about the
environment that support the status guo, attempts to change
will only stimulate the survival mechanisms of the group to
stay the same. Thus the autopoietic group will resist changes
that are perceived as a threat to the assumptions and
behaviors that are associated with the group's
identity. [Goldstein] Put simply, an organization has a set of
assumptions about the range of its environmental
possibilities. It organizes itself and its responses to
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maintain this particular range. If the organization
encounters a change that is not within the range of
possibilities or preplanned responses, it will attempt to
minimize if not deny the environmental fluctuations and resist
any change in its mode of organization. "Therefore, from
within the context of autopoiesis, change is unthinkable and
resistance is unchangeable.
"
[Goldstein] If this is the case,
resistance should not be regarded as willful myopia. Instead,
resistance to change is an example of a human mechanism to
ensure survival. The important point may be that resistance,
in light of this theory, can be viewed as necessary to support
the organization. The management challenge becomes one of
challenging that survival-oriented resistance to changes that
are demanded by the environment.
2. Reasons for Resistance
There are a myriad of interpersonal , technical and
organizational reasons cited in the literature for individual
and group resistance to change. The following reasons are
commonly noted:
• Personal Loss. People are afraid that changes will
require them to lose something of value. This may or may
not be a justifiable fear. However, job security, money,
pride and satisfaction, self esteem, friends and important
contacts, freedom, responsibility, authority and good
working conditions are all common examples of potential
losses that may drive these fears. [Kirkpatrick, Daniel,
Snavely]
• No Need For Change. Many people strongly support the
stability of the status quo and consider changes
unnecessary. This may be a result of a simple lack of
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understanding of those forces necessitating change or of
the benefits of change to either the individual or the
organization. [Kirkpatrick, Daniel, Lawrence]
Change Will Create More Harm Than Good. This perception
is often held by people at the lower echelons of an
organization when they feel that changes are being pushed
from above by leaders who do not possess an adeguate
understanding of the processes involved at the
bottom. [Kirkpatrick]
Manner of Communication. Changes introduced without
adeguate detail or explanations which do not convey in
understandable terms the necessity of the changes and
corresponding benefits often create an emotional
atmosphere charged with negative feelings toward those
implementing the changes. Workers may be unable to
identify their contributions to the change. Some, who
formerly performed their jobs with understanding and
satisfaction, may be forced to perform with confusion and
apprehension. Others are sensitive to hearing about
changes secondhand. [Kirkpatrick, Lawrence, McMurray]
Receptivity to Suggestions. Implementors may fall into
the trap of identifying themselves with the change and
thus feel threatened by suggested modifications to the
plan. This unreceptiveness in turn may be identified
mistakenly as a lack of personal or professional respect
for those who made the suggestions. [Lawrence]
Timing of Change. Changes introduced without regard to
timing or impatient expectations of how long a change
should take to be implemented cause stress in customary
work relationships and may be resented. [Lawrence]
Negative Attitudes Toward Change. Individuals or groups
may have negative attitudes toward their jobs, their boss,
or their organization that affect their receptivity to
those introducing change or to the change itself. Group
pressures strongly influence this factor of resistance.
[Coch and French, Kirkpatrick]
No Input. Implementors of change often overlook those
people with the ability to identify technical problems as
well as be able to identify undesirable social
conseguences. Employees may consider themselves
professionally skilled and responsible for current
organizational successes. Failure to tap this knowledge
usually leads to resentment caused by a loss of pride or
self esteem or feelings of little respect for past
accomplishments. [Lawrence, Daniel]
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Personal Criticism. Many people are concerned that
changes are initiated as a result of the failure of past
personal performances. Changes may, in fact, expose
individual or organizational inefficiencies that they fear
will come to the attention of management. This concern is
often associated with those who have identified themselves
with current procedures through project or procedure




Challenge to Authority. Change may be the object of a
test of power and influence. Refusal to change or comply
with change can be used by either seniors or subordinates
to remind the other of just who is really in charge.
[Kirkpatrick]
Change Requires Effort and Creates Burdens. Changes may
add more work and correspondingly result in confusion,
mistakes or other negative results. People are also
concerned about having to upgrade old skills, learn new
processes, and/or devote more time to the job. [Mealiea,
Snavely]
Loss of Control. Some people do not resist change itself,
but resist change which originates from an outside force;
they resent being changed. A simple, but forced, change
may meet resistance for no other reason than people resent
not being in control over what is happening to
them
.
[ Lawrence , Snave ly
]
3. A Mathematical Conceptualization of Resistance
In an attempt to add a quantitative dimension to the
study of the process of change, Richard Beckhard and Reuben
Harris developed the following mathematical framework for
determining the likelihood of individual/group responses to
change:
C = [ABD] > X
where C = Change
A = Level of dissatisfaction with the status quo
B = Desirability of the proposed change or end state
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D = Practicality of the change (minimum risk and
disruption)
X = "Cost" of changing
The value of the change, as determined by the product of
Factors A, B, and D, must outweigh the perceived costs (X) in
order for change to occur. If the cost of changing is too
high or the value of the change too low, individuals/groups
will resist the change .[ Beckhard and Harris, p. 98] H. J.
Reitz thinks the equation for resistance is even more simple.
Resistance to change equals "the uncertainty that one will be
as satisfied after the change as before, plus the effort
perceived as necessary to learn how to cope with the new
system.
"
[Reitz, p. 545] In this view, resistance is not an
idiosyncratic response by an unpredictable person, but a
calculated, rational response based on past experience.
4. Factors Influencing Resistance
The reasons why people resist change are multifaceted.
Many of them can be weakened if not completely overcome by
assessing planned changes from the perspectives of affected
personnel. Asking the questions that they might ask will help
a leader to better plan and manage the processes at hand.
"Will my old skills become obsolete?" "Will I lose my job?"
"Will I be able to perform as well under the new system as I
did under the old system?" "Will I have to work longer
hours?" "Will I still be in charge?" As Lawrence noted also,
resistance may also be "caused by certain blind spots and
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attitudes which staff specialists have as a result of their
preoccupation with the technical aspects of new
ideas.
"
[Lawrence] Leadership's self-evaluation and attention
to subordinates (who may be implementing management's plan)
are equally important for eliminating what may become the
roots of resistance caused by the implementors
themselves
.
The multitude of reasons why people resist change
would suggest that many are learned responses based on past
experiences. However, studies of resistance to changes in
information systems found relationships between support for
change and employee concerns for their individual needs.
Flicker, for example, found that individuals low in self-
esteem resist change more that those with higher self-
esteem. [Flicker ] Faunce found that higher social background,
higher levels of education, and higher positions within an
organization were associated with more favorable attitudes
toward change. [Faunce] Collins and Mann concluded that a
positive relationship exists between the needs of individuals
and the intent of the individuals to behave in support of the
change. People are more positively disposed toward change
when they perceive personal benefit. Similar to Coch and
French, Collins and Mann also noted a positive relationship
between favorable group norms toward the change and individual
group member's intention to support change. [Collins and Mann]
Finally, Steiber found that perceptions of "fair treatment" of
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displaced workers (retraining or relocation as compared to
being fired) resulted in a greater likelihood of favorable
employee responses to a change.
5. The Manifestations of Resistance to Change
Even ordinarily honest and loyal workers and executives
will sometimes lie, misrepresent, and engage in outright
sabotage of the new procedures, so bitter are the
antagonisms aroused . •• [ McMurry ]
In the studies evaluating resistance to change in
factory settings, it was not uncommon that efforts were made
at all levels to either block the introduction of the change
or to discredit it after its implementation in order to force
its removal. Resistance manifests itself in a number of
different behaviors. Caruth differentiated how people
displayed their resistance by noting that their behavior could
be either overt, or covert. [Caruth] Bitterness, grievances,
reductions in output, absenteeism, increases in the number of
requests for transfers, and turnover are examples of
individual overt responses commonly experienced. Among
groups, aggression toward management, chronic quarrels, and
slowdown strikes are further examples of this type of
resistance.
While an individual may agree with the change in
principle, he/she may also resist actual implementation.
Attempts may be made to inhibit the spread of a change by
attacking a plan indirectly. The expression of numerous
pseudo-logical reasons why a particular change will not work
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is an example of covert resistance. Rumors, unwillingness to
commit adequate resources to make change successful , lack of
openness, and "hidden agendas" are other examples ways
employees consciously or unconsciously sabotage a change
effort. Whether resistance is overt or covert, it can result
in significant expenses of time and money to any organization
that is not first prepared to deal with it and include plans
to minimize it.
C. RESISTANCE TO TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT/LEADERSHIP
With respect to the movement known as [TQM]
,
federal managers can be divided into three
groups ; those who have jumped on the
bandwagon, those who are tired of hearing it
discussed in seemingless endless detail in
seminars and hope it will go away, and those
who still have no idea what it is.[Shoop]
This scenario makes clear the importance of understanding
individuals' fear of change and possible objections to TQM
philosophy. Only with this understanding can these concerns
be addressed directly so that TQM is introduced effectively.
In reaching out to the third group described above, "those who
still have no idea what it is," it is essential not to allow
potential supporters to lapse into the second group, the
objectors. It is crucial that people's first encounter with
quality philosophy be positive, engaging the individual's
interest without threatening his/her familiar world. Fear of
change can sabotage the implementation of even the most
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sensible program, and this very obstacle faces current TQM/TQL
progress within the DoD.
Similar to Lewin, Coch and French, and others that
advocate using force-field analysis for organizational
prognosis, David Carr and Ian Littman described the forces
acting for and against the implementation of TQM in government
organizations. They believe that the driving forces are top
leader support, recent loss of work to private contractors,
success of TQM at partner agencies, employee empowerment, and
strategic planning. The restraining forces against TQM
implementation are some middle management resistance to the
changes required, complacency among units, failure of previous
attempts to implement other quality programs, fears of job
loss if productivity increases, and the observations that
plans tend to sit on shelves. Carr and Littman also advocate
finding strategies that weaken and remove the forces opposed
to TQM and reinforce forces in favor of TQM change. [Carr and
Littman]
Like the authors mentioned earlier who address the issues
of resistance to structural, technological, attitudinal and
behavioral change, Carr and Littman similarly categorize the
reasons why people in general resist TQM change. They
describe three general factors:
• Fear. A natural human reaction to uncertainty is fear.
Some people undoubtedly will be asked to learn new skills
while others will have to adjust to the shifts in
communication patterns, organizational structure,
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influence, authority and control that accompany this
change.
Resentment. Some changes will be imposed from without.
Nobody likes being ordered to comply. Implementing TQM
requires effort on the part of middle level leaders and
managers who are already busy. Others will resent this
effort as another improvement program that ultimately will
fail for lack of support. Still others have been around
long enough to remember being ordered to participate in
strategic planning, statistical process control, or
quality circles.
Technical considerations. Most people can, and reserve
the right to, evaluate an innovation on its technical
merits and determine if it will make their work
better. [Carr and Littman, pp. 168-169]
While this fear, resentment and reservation about the
technical benefits of TQM change are not uncommon individual
responses to other types of change, some of the responses to
TQM appear to be linked to hierarchial position. Resistance
to TQM often is attributed to specific groups, especially
supervisors, middle and top management. Many people at these
levels object to the implementation of TQM on the grounds that
their organization has a unique way of doing business, that
employees are too individualistic, or that TQM does not work
in a government environment. [Carr and Littman]
Johnson found in interviews and a survey of TQM
coordinators in business and government that top management
was often responsible for resistance in spite of their own
efforts to implement quality programs. While they stood
behind the full implementation of TQM, they eventually would
devalue the effort by falling back into the management style
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that they had been practicing for years. Top management was
also guilty of breeding resistance among middle managers by
failing to spend adeguate time with their subordinates
demonstrating the need for change, involving them in the
planning for necessary changes, or ensuring effective training
of them. Middle managers, on the other hand, were found to
resist TQM because they believed that there was no need to
change, because they felt excluded from the planning of the
change, and because they were concerned that their management
style was no longer appropriate or compatible with TQM
principles. [Johnson]
In a similar vein, a survey by the Conference Board, a
business research organization, found that "only a quarter of
the respondents report they can count on strong support for
TQM from middle managers and first-line supervisors."
Suggested reasons from the respondents for this resistance:
(1) Many firms tie reward and promotion to the bottom line,
not quality. (2) Managers complain of quality tasks added to
their already full work loads. (3) They believe that they
already produce quality work.[HRM]
In contrast to the objections to TQM techniques often
expressed by those potentially affected by change, some
professionals call attention to legitimate managerial concerns
to TQM implementation. Juran simplifies the arguments of
managers in organizations contemplating or undergoing a
transition to TQM/L into three broad groups:
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• TQM/L adds to the workloads of all (organizational) levels
• It disturbs the established organizational culture
• The change is a lot of work
Many upper managers are not enthusiastic about devoting
the time needed to take such actions. It would be much
simpler if they could somehow set broad goals to improve
guality planning and then delegate — that is stimulate
their subordinates to meet the goals. That approach has
been tried. It has failed because the prevailing ways of
guality planning are so completely woven into existing
fabric of company activities. The leadership change must
come from upper managers. [Juran]
The technical objections voiced by upper and middle managers
are indicative of the contemporary mindset of American
corporate culture. These attitudinal barriers must be
distinguished from legitimate time/cost barriers. It is the
task of the implementers of TQM to diagnose and manage these
obstacles early and decisively.
The implementation of the TQM/TQL philosophy is a change
that reguires discarding many of the "old" ways of doing
things. It will reguire changes in top leadership emphasis,
organizational structures, goals, orientation, responsibility
for guality, vision, inspection reguirements, and most
importantly, changes in people's attitudes. It is crucial for
the implementers of a new guality program to discern the true
nature of the complaints lodged against TQM/L. The intention
of the survey constructed for this research is to identify the
possible sources of resistance and the places where the
strongest resistance may be located. In light of the research
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findings, strategies for overcoming this resistance will be




The subjects for this research were Marine students and
staff members of three schools of the Marine Corps University
(MCU) located at the Marine Corps Combat Development Center,
Quantico, Virginia. Marine Corps University was chosen
primarily because the students of its individual schools were
not members of particular commands. They would not,
therefore, have reason to possibly fear being candid about
particular opinions. Also, due to the number of schools at
MCU, a broad cross-section of ranks could be surveyed.
A total of 338 Marines completed the prepared
questionnaire. The groups surveyed represented the Art of War
studies group and staff of the Command and Staff College
[Lieutenant Colonels], Command and Staff College Class of
1991-1992 [Majors], Amphibious Warfare Course 1992 [Captains],
and the Staff Noncommissioned Officers Academy Career Course
6-91 [Staff Sergeants]. Although surveying Corporals and
Sergeants at the Noncommissioned Officers Course, and Gunnery
Sergeants, Master/First Sergeants, and Sergeant Majors/Master
Gunnery Sergeants at the Senior Staff Noncommissioned Officers
Courses was intended, these courses were not in session and
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sufficient numbers of staff members of these ranks were not
available at the time of data collection.
B. SURVEY INSTRUMENT
A questionnaire was developed specifically for this study.
The items developed for the questionnaire were based on a
comprehensive review of literature examining individual
reasons why people resist change in general, and on Total
Quality literature detailing the different types of changes
that quality initiatives will require. In embracing Total
Quality Leadership, the Department of the Navy has used W.
Edwards Deming's "Fourteen Points" as the foundation for
program and curriculum development. The material, books and
periodicals dealing specifically with Deming's philosophies,
as well as interviews with the instructors of the Navy's
Senior Leadership Seminar, were used as a basis to identify
required quality initiative changes to the philosophies,
values and organization of the Marine Corps. Using examples
of changes required by thirteen of Deming's points, questions
were formulated that could best provide a comparative analysis
of Deming's principles with current Marine Corps practices,
values, or generally held beliefs. Examples of Deming's Point
Four ("End the practice of rewarding contracts on the basis of
price alone") were omitted due to the organizational structure
of the Marine Corps and the inability of the majority of
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An initial list of over 150 questions (not including
demographics) were categorized by Deming's points. These were
then reviewed for face and content validity by faculty members
and instructors with expertise in the areas of change, Total
Quality Leadership/Management, and survey design. As a result
of the review, items were eliminated if they were thought to
be redundant, not applicable to the Marine Corps, required an
understanding of quality principles by the respondents, or
were unable to be asked in such a way that the possible
answers could be quantified and evaluated accurately. A total
of 28 questions on generic change and 60 questions on Total
Quality change were chosen for the final questionnaire. The
survey scales and questions for both portions of the survey
are found in Appendix A. The actual survey provides a
detailed frame of reference for these two groups of questions





After the final round of academic evaluations of the
questionnaire, the questionnaire was formally pretested on a
sample of 10 Marine NCOs, SNCOs , Captains and Majors. During
post-test interviews with this very small sample, the
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respondents were asked to comment on the appropriateness of
the individual questions, their ease of comprehension, and the
changes they believed could improve the wording of questions
with which they had trouble. This pretesting process was an
effort to ensure that (1) the directions and individual
questions could be understood by the respondents, (2) that
knowledge of "change" and/or total quality principles were not
prerequisites to their understanding of the questions asked,
(3) the questions were not asked in such a way as to bias
individual responses in a particular direction, and (4) that
the questionnaire could be completed by the respondents in the
time allotted for data collection by the individual MCU
schools.
A final set of questions concerning demographics was
then added to the original 88, expanding the survey to 105
total questions. Questions concerning rank, experience and
military occupational specialty were included specifically to
identify any group characteristics that may be beneficial in
Total Quality Leadership curriculum development at the Marine
Corps University. Questions concerning education, personal
assignments and definitions of specific terms were included
for other comparisons and analyses.
3. Survey Validity
The validity of any measurement instrument refers to
the degree to which it measures what is intended to be
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measured. Of the three types of validity generally evaluated
(content, construct, and criterion-related), this survey only
attempted to establish content validity. That is, the
validity of this survey depends on how well the questions
cover the content domain of resistance to generic change and
resistance to change brought about by acceptance of Deming's
quality principles. Since the selection of questions was
based on a review of literature as well as evaluations by
academicians within these fields, it can be argued that
content validity was established.
C. LITERATURE REVIEW
An exhaustive review of current change literature and
total quality literature was conducted for the purpose of
survey design. A single source could not be found that had
previously attempted to measure resistance to generic change.
Further, no single source could be located that dealt
specifically with measuring resistance to total quality
change. Lacking either, it was necessary to return to the
literature of each subject and draw examples of types of
changes and reasons for possible individual resistance.
Both manual and computer searches of books, periodicals,
reports or other materials held by the Naval Postgraduate
School, by local and regional libraries, and by other Northern
California academic libraries were conducted. From these
searches, abstracts and bibliographies were obtained for
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resistance to generic change and TQM/L change. The manual
searches primarily were in the card catalog system, the
Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature
,
and Psychological
Abstracts . The following computer databases were also
searched:
• Semi-Automatic Bibliographic Retrieval System (SABIRS)
• Applied Science & Technology Index (ASTI)
• Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)
• OCLC Online Union Catalog (FirstSearch)
• Old "key word" database searches currently held by the
Naval Postgraduate School library. These included Change
and Resistance (1979 and 1980), MIS Resistance to Change
(1980), Total Quality Management/Leadership (1989), and
Organizational Change Planning (1981).
D. DATA COLLECTION TRIP
The guestionnaire was administered to 338 Marines. Of
those participating, approximately 107 were Staff Sergeants,
96 were Captains, 111 were Majors, and 17 were Lieutenant
Colonels. One Gunnery Sergeant, one Master Sergeant, one
Sergeant Major, one Second Lieutenant, and one Colonel also
responded to the survey. Two respondents did not identify
their rank. These sample groups represented approximately all
of the Staff Noncommissioned Officers Career Course, 50% of
the Amphibious Warfare Course (1992), 57% of the Command and
Staff College class, all of the Marine officers of the Art of
War studies group, and 85% of the staff of the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel at the Command and Staff College. Other
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demographic data describing these groups can be found in
Appendix C.
In administering the survey, several steps were taken to
ensure that the respondents would not feel pressured into
answering the questions in a specific direction. Every
attempt was made not to discuss Total Quality Leadership
before or during the survey administration or allow the
questionnaire to be identified with TQL change efforts. This
was done in an attempt to prevent the respondents from biasing
their answers based on their preconceptions or understanding
of TQM/TQL. Further, the respondents were requested to leave
the name and identification number sections of the survey
blank as proof that the value of their responses was in the
aggregate of their group and that individual responses would
not be attributed to them at a later date.
E. DRAWING CONCLUSIONS FROM THE DATA
1. Methods of Analysis
In identifying the incidence of resistance to TQL
change among individuals in the military — the primary
research question — this analysis evaluates the results
(means and standard deviations) of the survey responses by
subjectively comparing them to the literature supporting
Deming's philosophies and to interpretations of how a TQM/TQL
advocate would respond to the survey questions. For example,
if all survey subjects respond to a survey point in a manner
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that contradicts the probable response by a TQM advocate (as
described in the literature), then resistance to this
particular change is assumed. Where a majority of the
responses to a particular Denting "point" suggest broader
resistance, resistance to the principle that the statements
represent will be assumed.
In answering the secondary research guestions,
statistical analysis is used. First, all responses are
categorized by rank and subjectively evaluated in a manner
similar to that used in identifying resistance in the primary
research guestion. Then, to identify the possible basis for
this rank-group resistance, the responses to the individual
guestions identified as demonstrating resistance to aspects of
TQL are correlated with the group responses to guestions 1-28
(the part of the guestionnaire which evaluates factors that
influence an individual's willingness to be committed to
change in general). This statistical analysis indicates
whether there are differences by rank in the types of
resistance identified and highlights which factors may
influence this resistance.
2. Use of Opposing Scales and the Affects on Analysis
Two different Likert scales are used in the survey.
The first scale, used in parts one and two of the survey,
allowed the respondents to rate individual importance of
certain types of items to their commitment to change in
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general (part one), and also rate the degree to which loss of
certain items would influence personal commitment to change
(part two). This scale ranged from 1 (very low) to 5 (very
high). The second scale, used in part three of the survey,
asked the respondents to rate the degree to which they agree
with the question from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly
disagree). The reversed direction of these scales was a
result of pretest interviews in which those who just completed
the survey expressed a preference for this rating system.
This reversal, however, makes it inherently difficult to
evaluate correlation coefficients. In the analysis of the
data (Chapter IV), the reported signs (- or + ) of the
coefficients will appear to contrast with the conceptual
explanation of the relationships identified. Special
attention must be given to the fact that as a result of the
opposing scales, negative correlation coefficients do not
necessarily mean negative correlation. The conceptual
explanations given make the proper adjustment.
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IV. SURVEY DATA AND ANALYSIS
A. COMPILATION OF THE DATA
The broad scope of changes inherent to the introduction
and implementation of TQL required a lengthy survey. For this
reason, the respondents were asked to mark their answers on
computer graded response forms. Following the compilation of
all subjects' answers, the data were analyzed using SAS®
statistical analysis software. Procedures providing graphical
presentation of the data as well as tests of statistical
significance were used. These were the PROC UNIVARIATE, PROC
CORR and PROC FREQ/CHISQ commands respectively.
B. METHODS OF ANALYSIS
1 . Logic
As noted in the methodology, identification of the
incidence of resistance to TQL change efforts is based on an
analysis of summary statistics (mean and standard deviation).
This analysis gives a general approximation of the survey
sample's collective attitudes toward a particular change and
highlights which sources of resistance may be barriers to the
successful introduction and implementation of the TQL
philosophy.
To identify differences in distribution of responses
by rank, methods that compare the proportions rather than the
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frequencies within each group were required. This was
particularly important since the sample sizes for each rank
were different (i.e., Staff Sergeants (N=107) and Lieutenant
Colonels (N=17)). The frequency of a particular response to
a question by one rank legitimately cannot be compared to the
frequency of the same response by another rank unless the
sizes of the two groups are controlled. Therefore, a measure
must be used that compares percentages , not raw numbers , of a
particular response.
By using a box plot [or schematic plot] for a
graphical summary of the data, it is possible to identify the
individual range of answers by different ranks using the same
scale. This procedure specifically identifies the location of
the interquartile , or the middle fifty percent of all
responses. In the figures listed hereafter, this is
represented by the "box." The bottom and top edges of the box
are located at the sample 25th and 75th percentiles, while the
center horizontal line (* *) is drawn at the sample median,
and the central plus sign ( + ) is at the sample mean. The
length of the box indicates the degree of variance in
responses across the choices on the Likert scale. Vertical
lines, called whiskers, extend from each box as far as the
data extend, to a distance of 1 . 5 interquartile ranges. True
outliers to the sample distribution of the responses are
marked with either a zero or with an asterisk (*) depending on
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their relative location. [For a more detailed explanation
about this plot, see Tukey.
]
The value of this method of analysis is that it allows
differences in response ranges to be identified. The length
of the interguartile range (box), its location, and the
location of the mean and the median give a general impression
of the suspected degree of strength and inclination of
aggregate (group) attitudes toward particular statements.
In contrast to this type of graphical analysis,
statistical analysis is also used to confirm the response
differences between ranks, and to identify the possible basis
for this resistance (the secondary research guestion). The % 2
(chi-sguare) test is used to identify whether or not a
statistical association between cross-classified attributes
(e.g. rank and response) exists. The test assumes that the
null hypothesis [that there is no difference in the
distribution of responses between groups, i.e. ranks] is true.
A value is then calculated based on the difference between the
number of actual responses and the number of expected
responses in each box of the cross tabulation table (if the
null hypothesis were true) . If the chi-sguare value is large
according to the degrees of freedom, then the null hypothesis
is rejected and evidence of differences between groups is
supported. This test also gives a probability value that
demonstrates the level of statistical significance of the chi-
sguare value. For the purposes of this data analysis, the
57
probability value must be .10 or smaller to conclude
significant statistical association.
The value of the chi-square test is that it
distinguishes differences in the response proportions. For
example, means of 3 (neutral) of two group responses to the
same question may suggest that both groups feel open-minded
toward a particular change. Further, the interquartile range
may be in the same location, thus confirming the earlier
conclusion. However, the size of one interquartile range may
be somewhat smaller. While proximate interquartile range
location, means, and median may suggest that these groups feel
the same way about a particular statement, the chi-square test
will tell whether this difference in size indicates that one
group actually is impartial, while the other group may have
strong biases in both directions (strongly agree/strongly
disagree)
.
The next step in the analysis is to attempt to
identify factors that may influence the significant types of
resistance demonstrated in the initial analyses described
above. To do this, the questions showing differences in
attitude toward TQL by rank using boxplot analysis are
statistically correlated with the frequencies of group
responses to questions 1 through 28, which identify factors
that affect a person's willingness to accept change in
general . By comparing the correlations of the ratings of each
TQL concept with the individual factors that affect a person's
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willingness to accept change in general, an understanding can
be gleaned of the important influences which may be related to
an individual's compulsion to resist specific TQL ideas. In
other words, correlations between important reasons for being
committed to change in general and attitudes toward TQL could
support conclusions about the reasons TQL is resisted. Since
there is no standard for identification of "good" or
"significant" correlation coefficients in this type of
research, only those correlation coefficients that show
statistical significance at more than the .10 probability
level will be discussed.
2 . Reporting
The large number of guestions and variables prohibit
the reporting of all responses and freguencies. In answering
the primary research guestion, only specific means and
standard deviations are presented. The means and standard
deviations for all guestions are given in Appendix D. In
answering the secondary research guestions, only the box plots
and results of the corresponding statistical tests that
indicate possible resistance are reported. A complete
presentation of these results, including freguency tables of
responses to these guestions, their chi-sguare values, and
corresponding correlation coefficients and their probabilities
is given in Appendix E.
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C . DATA
1. Mean Ratings of Sources of Resistance to Change
A means analysis of the data was conducted to identify
the population (all subjects) means and standard deviations to
all questions. This provides an overall indication of general
attitudes toward TQL and the sources of resistance to change.
Listed in Appendix D are the means and standard deviations of
the responses to all questions. As noted in the methodology,
questions 29-88 are arranged by the Deming point which they
represent.
This means analysis tells a number of things about the
survey sample. In part one of the survey, respondents rate
"possible loss of job satisfaction" (question 1, mean = 4.19)
the most important determinant in their personal commitment to
a change. This factor is followed by "I am not allowed input
into the change effort" (question 12, mean = 3.73), "I am told
what to do but not why" (question 10, mean = 3.60), and "I
resent hearing about changes secondhand" (question 18, mean =
3.58). Of lowest importance among the factors listed in part
one is "Change becomes an opportunity for others to challenge
my authority" (question 17, mean = 2.41), "There is usually no
need to change" (question 5, mean = 2.56), "In the short term,
change will create more harm than good" (question 6, mean =
2.74), and "I may have negative attitudes toward my job,
organization, or my boss" (question 11, mean = 2.86).
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Section two of the survey sought to identify the
degree to which certain types of loss would influence an
individual's commitment to a change. Highest overall among
the types of losses are responsibility (guestion 23, mean =
4.19), pride (guestion 19, mean = 4.16), and authority
(guestion 24, mean = 3.89). Rated lowest overall among these
types of losses are important contacts (guestion 27, mean =
2.54), friends (guestion 26, mean = 2.99), and status
(guestion 28, mean = 3.02).
Encouragingly, in section three of the survey the
responses to guestions which described examples of TQL changes
to the present Marine Corps environment did not show
consistent patterns of means. This fact indicates a general
level of support for the changes mandated by Deraing's
principles. A similar analysis of section three is also done
by rank subgroups. Correspondingly, a pattern that would
suggest that the sample ranks have objections to the Deming
principles themselves, as opposed to only individual examples
of change encouraged by the principles, is not found.
When a similar means analysis of section three is also
done by rank subgroups, it appears to explain much of the
variance. Taken individually, however, guestions 58, 67 1 , 71,
Question 67 was eliminated from analysis due to the many
guestions asked concerning this guestion and two others (65-
66). Many of the survey subjects did not feel gualified to
accurately evaluate technical manual work standards that they





, 80, and 81 do display means in directions inconsistent
with the philosophies advocated by TQM/TQL authors and
champions. These responses, which indicate some degree of
resistance to a change initiated by the implementation of TQL,
will be discussed further.
In evaluating the survey responses one by one, nine
questions showed possible resistance by one or more rank
subgroups. These were questions 30, 40, 41, 42, 44, 58, 71,
80, and 81 respectively.
2. Subgroup Comparisons by Rank
a. Resiststnce to Changes in Roles
Implementation of TQL ultimately will redefine or
shift some of the responsibility of some roles within the
Marine Corps. Since SNCOs hold positions from first-line
supervisors to what is considered top leadership, TQL
supporters would argue that they must be included in "setting
the course today, to be in business tomorrow. " [Scherkenbach]
Rather than allowing individuals within an organization to
only focus attention internally to get a unit to work together
and thus minimize friction inside the organization, Deming
Questions 72-75 were eliminated from survey analysis due
to the nature of the questions when evaluated individually
(out of context). Originally, these questions were part of
one statement designed to evaluate perceptions of what a
"good" leader is. TQM literature suggests that a "good"
leader, as defined by these actions, often fails to recognize
the variance introduced by them, and thus suboptimizes the
performance of his subordinates by following this traditional
management style.
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encourages top leadership to establish constancy of purpose at
all levels of an organization. The TQL philosophy emphasizes
the need for each individual within a unit also to focus on
reguirements emanating from outside the organization — to
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RANK asgt Capt Mai. LtCol
Figure 6 Responses to Question 30
Figure 6 shows how each rank group responds to the
survey question which assigns a "constancy of purpose"
function to SNCOs (question 30 3 ). In this figure, the
difference between the responses by the Staff Sergeants and
3Question 30: SNCOs within a command should be
responsible for policy, values, and the long term course for
the organization.
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the Majors is notable. Looking at the location of the
boxplots, it can be seen that the interquartile range, i.e.,
central 50% of the response distribution, is skewed toward
disagreement for the Majors and agreement for the Staff
Sergeants. The average answer (mean, as denoted by (+)) is
close to "disagree" for the Majors, but closer to "agree" for
the Staff Sergeants. Finally, the location of the median (as
denoted by the (* *)) illustrates similar differences in
the responses of the two groups. In comparison with the
responses of the Captains, who show a fairly even distribution
around the neutral midpoint, the plots of the responses for
the Majors and Staff Sergeants suggest a stronger inclination
in one direction or the other.
In contrast to how a TQL champion would answer
question 30, and in contrast to the responses by the Staff
Sergeants, the Majors tend to show resistance to the idea that
SNCOs should have responsibility for policy and planning
within a command. Given the frequency of Majors' general
disagreement (74%) 4 with such a suggested plan, it can be
concluded that Majors disagree with organizational changes
that would give SNCOs license to focus on broader concerns
inside and outside of the unit.
'Refer to Appendix D. Seventy-four percent denotes the
total percentage of responses by Majors that were marked
"disagree" (45%) or "strongly disagree" (28%).
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It is possible, on the other hand, that the Majors'
responses may signal something else: most Majors, in fact,
may not identify SNCOs at all in the "top management" roles.
This presumption, if it exists, may have affected the
respondents' reading of the survey guestion and may have
affected their response. Correlational analysis shows no
telling relationships between the Majors' answers to guestion
30 and their responses to any of the guestions measuring
influences that affect their commitment to change in general.
Thus the survey data offers no insight into the roots of the
Majors' sentiment on expanded roles for the SNCOs.
b. Resistance to Changes in Processes
TQL supporters advocate de-emphasizing inspections
on the grounds that guality can be built into a product or
service without the unnecessary expense of trying to manage
outcomes by detecting defects. They would agree, however,
that inspections for safety reasons are an attribute of
guality performance that few, if any, guality-minded managers
or leaders would deny. Figures 7 and 8 identify the range
of survey responses on the guestion of whether these types of
inspections should be de-emphasized in the Marine Corps
(guestions 40 5 and 41") . The box plots for the answers of
sQuestion 40: Ceasing emphasis on individual performance
inspections will compromise safety or the guality of
performance that we presently observe.
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40. ceasing emphasis on individual performance inspections will
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Figure 7 Responses to Question 40
Marines of all ranks are nearly identical. Captains',
Majors', and Lieutenant Colonels' survey responses to
questions 40-42 7 appear generally neutral on the issue of
inspections, but the Staff Sergeants lean toward support for
inspections to assess individual and unit performance. The
Staff Sergeants' frequency of responses in the direction of
agreement (question 40 = 55%, question 41 = 61%) suggests a
degree of concern that would need to be addressed when teaching
"Question 41: Ceasing emphasis on unit inspections will
compromise safety or the quality of performance that we
presently observe.
'Question 42: I need to inspect my subordinate's work to
ensure that it is of the highest quality.
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41. Ceasing enphasis on unit inspections will conpronise safety
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Figure 8 Response to Question 41
or supporting this TQL perspective.
In identifying the possible basis for the Staff
Sergeants' resistance, it is interesting to note that in both
questions 40 and 42 (Figure 9) their responses are correlated
(r=-.18 and r=-.27, respectively) with their responses on the
question of the importance of "possible loss of job
satisfaction" (as defined in question 1 as working conditions,
pride, responsibility, friends and important contacts) and job
security (as defined in question 3 as authority, personal
freedom, and status). The more likely they are to rate job
satisfaction and job security as important factors in being
committed to a change in general, the more likely they are to
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Figure 9 Responses to Question 42
agree that de-emphasizing inspections would compromise safety
or performance and that they do need to inspect their
subordinate's work. Assuming that Staff Sergeants as a group
personally identify with the role of the inspector, this
commonality suggests that TQL changes that alter this role
will meet some degree of resistance from at least one group of
SNCOs
.
The Staff Sergeants' answers to guestion 42 show a
correlation with guestions 5 8 and 26 9 (r=-.20 and r=-.21,
"Question 5: There is usually no need to change.
'Question 26: Loss of important contacts influences my
commitment to change.
68
respectively) . As Staff Sergeants tend to agree that
inspections are necessary, they also tend to rate higher the
belief that "there is usually no need to change," and "loss of
important contacts" as important factors in their likelihood
to be committed to a change. These again support the
suggestion that changes in inspection procedures that alter
roles or social relationships will meet resistance from some
SNCOs
.
c. Resistance to identifying necessary change
The belief of middle managers in business
environments that they already produce guality work has been
identified in research as one reason why these groups are more
likely to resist "buying in" to total guality management. [HRM]
The Marine Corps' increasingly competitive promotion system
and school selection system may support a similar attitude
among officers and SNCOs. As the selection process becomes
more competitive, so conventional wisdom goes, only "the
cream" rises to the top. This inference presents a
significant roadblock to the continuous improvement of any
product or service and thus works in opposition to a
fundamental tenet of TQL. While the range of answers in
Figure 10 for the Captains, Majors, and Lieutenant Colonels
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Figure 10 Responses to Question 44
to question 44 lu incline toward agreement with this survey
statement. Like the middle managers in business environments,
the presumption that one already produces quality work may
become a hurdle which interferes with SNCO acceptance of TQL.
Interestingly, the responses by Staff Sergeants to
question 44 are correlated (r = -0.17) with question 2 11 .
That is to say, the greater the agreement about the level of
personal performance, the higher the rating of the importance
of "possible loss of money" to their commitment to a change.
10Question 44: My personal performance is always at my
highest level of capability.
"Question 2: Possible loss of money (bonuses lost, for
example) is important to my commitment to change.
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d. Resistance to Changes in Traditional Motivators
Awards have long been used as an incentive by
business, government, and military organizations for achieving
a certain level of performance. Senior managers who use an
award system, however, often overlook the possibility that
their system may create barriers to quality. Internal
competition within an organization often can thwart the lines
of communication necessary to ensure product or service
quality. True organizational teamwork may suffer in
individual efforts to be the "best," and neither the customers
nor the organization will have gained much by the competition.
Further, the standards of the award may become the criteria by
which quality products or services are defined. For these
reasons, total quality advocates tend to disagree with
question 58 12 at face value.
In contrast to this TQL belief, the survey
responses in Figure 11 show that all ranks surveyed seem
predisposed to support the use of awards as a motivational
tool. The strong support from respondents of all levels of
seniority indicates likely resistance to changes in the Marine
Corps award system. The many different survey questions which
correlate with these groups' responses to this question about
competition do not show a distinct pattern consistent among
"Question 58: Personal or unit competition for awards
(informal as well as formal recognition) increases the quality
of performance of all who compete.
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Figure 11 Responses to Question 58
all ranks. Thus it is impossible to surmise a possible
overall basis for this resistance to changes in current award
processes. Among Staff Sergeants, however, increases in the
likelihood of agreement are related to higher ratings of loss
of money (guestion 2, r=-.17), loss of pride (guestion 19, r=-
.31), loss of job stability (guestion 20, r=-.43), loss of
money (guestion 21, r=-.16), loss of friends (guestion 26, r=
-.21), loss of important contacts (guestion 27, r=-.22) and
loss of status (guestion 28, r=-.19). For Captains, increases
in agreement are related (r=-.25) to higher importance of
participation (guestion 12, "I am not allowed input...") for
personal commitment to a change. For Majors, the responses
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toward leaning agreement are correlated (r=-.17) with higher
ratings for concern that the change becomes an opportunity for
others to challenge personal authority (question 17).
Finally, agreement with question 44 by the Lieutenant Colonels
is correlated with concern that change adds work and confusion
(question 14, r=-.51) and change becomes an opportunity to
challenge personal authority (question 17, r = -0.45). These
responses also are correlated with the identification of three
types of losses as factors in an individual's level of
commitment to a change: pride (question 19, r=-.57), job
stability (question 20, r=-.57) and finally status (question
28, r=-.55).
e. Resistance to Changes in the Status Quo
American military organizations traditionally
engender in their personnel a high degree of pride in how
they, as organizations, confront and overcome challenges. For
Marines, this confidence in how the Corps traditionally
resists external pressures to change can also be an underlying
reason for not accepting the need for TQL13 . If viewed as a
DoD mandate that ignores the unique leadership principles that
have been practiced successfully by generations of Marines,
TQL is bound to be rejected unconsidered and untried. When
queried (Figure 12) on their opinion of the effectiveness of
"See chapter 2, part lc of this thesis for a description
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Figure 12 Responses to Question 71





Sergeants and Majors appear fairly optimistic about the status
quo, the Captains look neutral, while the Lieutenant Colonels
seem slightly less sure. It would be unwise to conclude that
these survey responses, especially by the Staff Sergeants and
Majors, indicate outright resistance to TQL. However, these
responses may suggest that ideas that appear foreign to
traditional leadership fundamentals will be met with some
degree of skepticism. Without understanding the ways TQL
principles complement rather than contradict established
14Question 71: Present Marine Corps
fundamentals can get us through all situations.
leadership
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Marine Corp doctrine, and without an appreciation for the
benefits TQL could bring to the Marine Corps, some Marines
will reject TQL simply out of loyalty to time-honored Marine
ideals
.
The responses of the Majors to this question showed
some relationship (r= -.0.16) to their responses to question
9 1S . That is, as the Majors tend to agree with the statement
on leadership fundamentals, they also tend to put a higher
value on the competence of the individual making the change.
This suggests that the Majors show a particular concern with
the abilities and credentials of the implementers of change in
the area of leadership fundamentals. The responses of the
Staff Sergeants, on the other hand, show no explanatory
correlation for their optimism.
f. Resistance to TQL Tools and Techniques
The application of quantitative methods is one
aspect of training that is strongly advocated by TQL followers
yet resisted by many people out of fear or lack of
understanding. This resistance often comes in the form of
excuses such as "We rely on our experience," to solve
problems, or "Our problems are different here," or "That's for
manufacturing, not for me.
"
[Scherkenbach] Statistical
thinking and statistical methods provide powerful analytic
lsQuestion 9: Lack of respect for the competence of the
person making the change is an important influence to my
personal commitment to a change.
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tools for discovering special and common causes that may be
preventing achievement of a quality product or service.
Furthermore, they provide an opportunity to measure
modifications in processes and a means to evaluate whether or
not changes implemented are in fact working. The emphasis by
champions of quality on quantitative methods, however, is not
to be construed as a substitution of technical methods for
leadership. More appropriately, it should be thought of as an
effort to enhance the problem solving abilities of people who
can affect quality.
The very high incidence of disagreement to
questions 80 lb and 81 17 , as displayed in Figures 13 and 14 1*,
by the Captains, Majors, and Lieutenant Colonels suggest that
the use of quantitative tools is one area of TQL
implementation in which solid resistance will be felt,
especially among the officers.
While the responses to these survey questions are
correlated to a broad range of part one and part two survey
questions by the various ranks, no single reason appears as an
lfcQuestion 80: Quantitative methods (basing decisions on
numbers gained through different measurement techniques vice
opinions or experience) should be taught at all levels.
17Question 81: Quantitative methods should be used as a
primary factor in daily decision making at all levels.
"Note: The apparent absence of an interquartile range
(box) for the Captains and Lieutenant Colonels is the result
of such a high frequency of answers (41% and 47%,
respectively) at this particular response choice.
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8u. Quantitative methods (basing decisions on numbers gained through
different measurement techniques vice opinions or experience) should
be taught at all levels.
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Figure 13 Responses to Question 80
obvious basis for this resistance. For Captains responding to
question 81, loss of responsibility [to a "process"] (question
23) shows the strongest correlation (r=.28) as a basis for
their resistance. Lieutenant Colonels, on the other hand,
show a correlation (r=.44 and r=.42, respectively) in both
question 80 and question 81 to question 4 19 . This
relationship demonstrates that their objection to both
teaching quantitative methods to all ranks and using them as
a primary factor in daily decision making may be based on a
fear of being required to change jobs or possibly locations.
19Question 4: Possible loss of job stability (requirement
to change jobs or PCS) influences my commitment to a change.
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daily decision Baking at all levels.
Strongly
Disagree +
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Figure 14 Responses to Question 81
The Majors' and the Lieutenant Colonels' responses
show some correlation (r=-.21 and r=-.42, respectively) to
question 17 2°. This correlation indicates that the stronger
the objection to the use of quantitative methods among these
groups, the lesser the concern that changes will provide
opportunities for challenges to personal authority. These
statistical relationships between the responses of the field
grade officers do not provide us a more clear picture of why
these ranks object to reliance on quantitative methods, but
2
°Question 17: "Change becomes an opportunity for others
to challenge my authority" influences my commitment to a
chanqe.
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they do suggest that their objections are not based on a fear
of loss of control.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Successful implementation of Total Quality Leadership must
include attention to reshaping, and in some instances
replacing, various aspects of the Marine Corps' organizational
culture. This culture is composed of style, climate,
traditional character, norms, core assumptions, decision
procedures, and leadership attitudes. Some TQL principles
challenge these components individually and collectively.
Others are supported by them. Recognizing where changes are
necessary and how strongly particular changes will be opposed
is a key to success in managing the change process and gaining
commitment to TQL.
A. CONCLUSIONS
In a survey of four ranks of Marine students at the Marine
Corps University, a general lack of resistance to the
principles that embody TQL is found. Of the 60 survey
questions aimed at identifying Marines' resistance to changes
required by TQL, only four questions (representing three of
Deming's 14 points) appear to meet resistance. When all
responses are evaluated on a rank subgroup basis, these four
questions and an additional five others (representing five of
Deming's 14 points) appear to meet resistance by one or more
rank subgroups. The neutrality or agreement expressed on the
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remainder of the survey questions (in both analyses) suggests
that Marines are far less resistant to TQL than many people
assume. Marines' compliance on a preponderance of TQL issues
underscores the compatibility of Total Quality Management with
traditional Marine Corps doctrine. While this apparent lack
of resistance is encouraging, an analysis of survey data does
expose resistance among some ranks to specific types of
changes typical of TQM/TQL efforts. The Marines surveyed
express varying degrees of resistance to the following
specific changes:
• Majors show some resistance to the suggestion that SNCOs
within a command be responsible for policy, values, and
the long term course for the organization.
• Staff Sergeants show some resistance to de-emphasizing
individual performance and unit inspections.
• Staff Sergeants show an overall inclination to inspect
subordinates' work to ensure that it is of the highest
quality. This indicates possible resistance to changes in
the process or reasons for inspections.
• Staff Sergeants show a higher inclination than other ranks
to evaluate their personal performance as always at their
highest level. This suggests possible resistance to TQL
changes based on the presumption that no changes are
necessary because they already produce quality work.
• All ranks surveyed demonstrate a belief in the idea that
competition for awards increases the performance of all
who compete. This indicates possible resistance to TQL
changes which reevaluate the contributions of awards as
they traditionally are used to motivate or recognize
individuals or units.
• Staff Sergeants and Majors tend to show agreement with the
idea that current Marine Corps leadership fundamentals can
get the Marine Corps through all situations. This
indicates possible resistance to TQL changes based on
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loyalty to Marine Corps ideals and their satisfaction with
the status quo.
Captains, Majors, and Lieutenant Colonels tend to object
to both the teaching of quantitative methods to all ranks
and the use of quantitative methods as a primary factor in
daily decision making. This suggests that TQL changes
which involve the introduction and use of these tools will
meet some resistance, at least from the officers.
It must be remembered that the Marines surveyed expressed
resistance to specific changes supported by TQL principles,
but not to the principles themselves. The purpose of this
research is to measure Marines' resistance to changes which
affect their workplace procedures and relationships. It does
not attempt to determine whether Marines support or oppose the
implementation of TQL in the Marine Corps. The questions were
worded in such a way that the essence of a change required by
TQL was articulated, not the rationale of the philosophy
itself
.
In an attempt to understand possible bases for the
particular resistance identified, the responses of each rank
which expresses resistance to a TQL change question were
correlated with that rank's responses to questions which
evaluate the factors that influence commitment to change in
general . These analyses were done only for rank groups that
show evidence of resistance to specific aspects of TQL as
described above. The most noteworthy of these findings are:
The responses of the Staff Sergeants who demonstrate some
resistance to ceasing emphasis on individual performance
and unit inspections show a correlation to possible loss
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of job satisfaction and job security as important factors
to being committed to a change in general.
The Staff Sergeants who are more inclined to feel the need
to inspect subordinates' work show a tenancy to rate
"there is usually no need to change" and "loss of
important contacts" as important factors to being
committed to change in general
.
The Staff Sergeants who are more inclined to rate their
personal performance as always at their highest capability
show some tenancy to rate "possible loss of money" as a
factor in their likelihood to commit to change in general.
The Majors who are optimistic that present Marine Corps
leadership fundamentals can get us through all situations
show some tenancy to rate the competence of the individual
making the change as important for their personal
commitment to change in general
.
The very high incidence of disagreement among all ranks
with teaching quantitative methods and among the officers
with using quantitative methods as a primary factor in
daily decision making is correlated with expressed
importance of "loss of responsibility" among the Captains,
and possible "loss of job stability" among the Lieutenant
Colonels.
Only more detailed studies can reveal why individuals
resist the changes they do. But armed with the knowledge of
which changes are most likely to offend Marines' sense of job
satisfaction, security, and stability, it will be easier for
planners of TQL changes in the Marine Corps to fashion the
transition in such a way that it meets with the fewest
objections possible.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
TQL methodology itself urges leaders to base process and
policy on informed decisions. These decisions require
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supporting data as well as experience and opinion. Likewise,
this thesis is an attempt to make available to Marine Corps
planners data gathered about the predispositions of Marines of
different ranks to changes prompted by the implementation of
TQL. The survey serves to identify TQL changes that seem
threatening to specific groups. This information is valuable
to those Marines charged with developing the education and
implementation plan to ensure the success of TQL in the Marine
Corps
.
What implications does identification of these concerns or
values have for military training and education in the area of
TQL? What impact does this have on the successful
implementation of TQL in the Marine Corps? In answering these
questions, it appears encouraging first to note that Marines
generally are accepting and/or neutral to the majority of
changes prompted by TQL. Thus those individuals responsible
for implementing TQL in the Marine Corps need not be skeptical
of the success of their efforts. Only a few examples of TQL
changes show resistance, and this resistance usually is not
across all ranks. However, this research does support the
need for special emphasis and attention to TQL changes that
may seem threatening to specific groups with specific
concerns
.
The educational system within the Marine Corps can be used
to help overcome these concerns. While it can provide a non-
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threatening environment for Marines to learn the principles
and premises of TQL, it should also focus on the following:
Communicating the expected affects of TQL principles,
premises, and changes on individuals, ranks, roles, and
the organization as a whole.
Reinforcing the value of being receptive to the needs and
concerns of subordinates.
Developing in Marine leaders communication technigues and
listening skills that enhance their ability to recognize,
reframe, and overcome resistance to TQL as it is
encountered in their regular duties.
Developing a greater awareness in all Marines of the
pressures that are making the introduction of TQL into the
Marine Corps a necessary and important change.
These strategies, although broad in nature, can serve to
weaken the link between the perceived consequences of change
and the implementation of TQL in the Marine Corps. The
successful absorption of leadership ideals endorsed by TQL
will be most successful in a classroom which concomitantly
operates along TQL lines. The simultaneous learning and
modeling of TQL in the classroom makes the Marine Corps
educational system a critical force for challenging thinking
and behavior aimed at maintaining the status quo. Overcoming
resistance early and effectively via the educational system
may mean the difference between a Marine Corps that is only
superficially compliant with the principles of TQL and a
Marine Corps that is committed to improving constantly the
quality of its products and services.
85
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
The work reported here suggests several research
possibilities. First, the surveying of those ranks of
noncommissioned officers, staff noncommissioned officers, and
officers not available at the time of data collection is
warranted. Replication of this study both within the Marine
Corps schools system and in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) would
help determine the generalizability of the findings. This
would provide a more detailed view of the attitudes of all
Marines in leadership positions toward TQL principles and TQL
change. Secondly, moving beyond the notion of replication,
the relationship of needs, group influence, and leadership
style should be studied in different TQL change situations.
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY QUESTIONS BY CATEGORY
Scale - Part One
Individual importance to being personally committed to a change:
1 = Very low 2 = Low 3 = Moderate 4 = Fairly high 5 = High
Questions
1. Possible loss of job satisfaction (working conditions, pride, responsibility, friends and
iiportant contacts)
2. Possible loss of money (bonuses lost, for example)
3. Possible loss of job security (authority, personal freedom, status)
4. Possible loss of job stability (requirement to change jobs or PCS)
5. There is usually no need to change
6. In the short term, change will create more harm than good
7. In the long term, change will create more harm than good
8. Personal lack of respect for the person making the change
9. Personal lack of respect for the competence of the person making the change
10. I am told what to do but not why
11. I may have negative attitudes toward the job, organization, or my boss
12. I am not allowed input into the change effort
13. The change may be the result of someone's personal criticism of my previous efforts
14. Change adds work, confusion, mistakes and other negative results
15. Change requires effort by all involved or affected
16. The change may be poorly timed
17. Change becomes an opportunity for others to challenge my authority
18. I resent hearing about changes secondhand
Scale - Part Two
Degree to which the loss of this would influence my commitment to a change.













Scale - Part Three
Degree to vhich I agree/disagree with the following statement
—




5 = Strongly disagree
Point One: Create constancy of purpose for improvement of product and service.
29. In planning, it is the sole responsibility of higher headquarters and staff sections to determine
the needs and requirements of the product or service user and pass that information to the
appropriate levels within their command.
30. SNCOs within a command should be responsible for policy, values, and the long term course for
the organization.
31. Long term planning is effective at levels lower than the commanding officer.
32. Long term planning should be made at levels lower than the commanding officer.
33. Marine Corps policies and practices that reward short term planning more than long term planning
are necessary.
45. Officers within a command should be responsible for policy, values, and the long term course for
the organization.
88. Officers should include SNCOs in formulating policy, values, and the long term course for the
organization.
Point Two: Adopt the new philosophy.
34. The nature of the Marine Corps' mission and training requires a dependence on short term planning
over long term planning.
35. Everything is okay in the Marine Corps, so why change?
36. Although faced with reduced funding and manning levels, our present course in the Marine Corps
will allow a high degree of readiness and mission accomplishment without major changes.
37. I believe that the Marine Corps needs to make major improvements in the way we operate.
38. I believe that we should put more emphasis on improving the quality of what we do than meeting
budget (money) and schedules (time required to meet specific objectives).
Point Three: Cease dependence on mass inspection.
39. The Marine Corps is dependent on inspections to achieve desired results.
40. Ceasing emphasis on individual performance inspections will compromise safety or the quality of
performance that we presently observe.
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41. Ceasing emphasis on unit inspections will compromise safety or the quality of performance that
we presently observe.
42. I need to inspect my subordinate's work to ensure that it is of the highest quality.
Point Five: Improve constantly and forever the system of production and service .
43. The Marine Corps is as good as it can get.
44. My personal performance is always the at my highest level of capability.
46. Lack of time (training time, personal time or other) is one of the biggest if not the single
biggest barrier to continuously improving personal or unit performance.
47. Continuous improvements to quality of personal or unit performance cost more time, money, or
other resources.
48. The cost of continuous improvements to the quality of personal or unit performance is usually
more than the benefits gained.
Point Twelve: Remove barriers to pride of workmanship.
49. One of a leader's most important jobs is to remove organization/system barriers (people,
policies, procedures, etc.) that hinder efficiency and effectiveness.
50. It's too much effort to remove barriers that keep a unit from being effective.
51. People above me create barriers that won't allow me to improve.
52. Current Marine Corps policies and procedures don't allow enough latitude or freedom to improve
my work.
Point Eight: Drive out fear.
53. Leadership by fear and force is intolerable.
54. Leadership by fear and force squanders our greatest resource, our people.
55. There is no place for leadership by fear and force in the Marine Corps.
56. Some Marines (officer and enlisted) need to be led by fear and force in order to get them to
perform to standard.
Point Mine: Break down barriers between staff areas.
57. Team play within a unit is a primary requirement for achieving mission accomplishment.
58. Personal or unit competition for awards (informal as well as formal recognition) increases the
quality of performance of all who compete.
59. Close supervision and/or formal inspections foster communication and cooperation within a unit.
60. "Assistance visits" from higher headquarters or within a unit foster communication and
cooperation within a unit.
Point Ten: Eliminate slogans, exhortations and targets for the work force .
61. Slogans ("Safety is everyone's responsibility," for example) significantly contribute to
individual or unit performance.
62. Most units rely heavily on slogans to motivate Marines to do a better job.
63. Slogans motivate Marines to do a better job.
64. Slogans that come from a unit's leadership tend to have little or no affect on the attitudes or
performance of junior Marines.
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Point Eleven: Eliminate numerical quotas.
65. Technical manual (TH) work standards are reliable estimates of how long a job should take.
66. Marine technicians that cannot meet TH work standards usually lack experience, knowledge or
motivation.
67. Eliminating work standards causes confusion or the need for increased supervision.
Point Seven: Institute leadership.
68. NCOs receive adequate leadership training for their particular rank and responsibility.
69. Officers receive adequate leadership training for their particular rank and responsibility.
70. Most officers and SNCOs have the opportunity to participate in the same small group or unit
training that has been scheduled for their units.
71. Present Marine Corps' leadership fundamentals can get us through all situations.
72. A good leader is one who sets up a system, directs the work through subordinates.
73. A good leader develops a basis to set standards of performance for his subordinates.
74. A good leader sets goals and targets for mission accomplishment.
75. A good leader rates subordinate performance against these targets.
Point Six: Institute training.
76. Continuing MOS training for all Marines should be among the foremost concerns of unit leadership.
77. The Marine Corps should invest more time and money in MOS training for personnel.
78. Marines generally feel that they have received the proper amount of MOS skill training to be
successful in their jobs.
79. I feel that I have received the proper amount of MOS training to be successful in my job.
80. Quantitative methods (basing decisions on numbers gained through different measurement techniques
vice opinions or experience) should be taught at all levels.
81. Quantitative methods should be used as a primary factor in daily decision making at all levels.
Point Thirteen: Institute a vigorous program of education and retraining.
82. Continuing education (warfighting, college, other outside education) for all Marines should be
among the foremost concerns of unit leadership.
83. The Marine Corps should invest more money in educating (warfighting, college, etc.) personnel.
84. I feel that I have received the proper amount of education to be successful in my job.
85. I feel that emphasizing outside education for all ranks will improve individual performance and
unit readiness.
Point Fourteen: Take action to accomplish the transformation.
86. "Do not tell Marines how to do something, just tell them what you want done." Marines are
experienced enough to figure out how to accomplish the desired outcome.
87. Leaders should not work directly with their subordinates on the process, the how and the why
unless their subordinates seek assistance. They should only supervise.
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APPENDIX B
MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY CHANGE SURVEY
Dear Survey Participant:
This survey is designed to obtain your thoughts and opinions
about how you respond to change in general, and more specifically,
what your attitudes are regarding specific changes planned for the
future
.
The survey will be administered, collected and analyzed by a
fellow Marine who is a student of the Naval Postgraduate School.
It includes several guestions concerning you and your job. Your
responses will be kept completely confidential and will be combined
with others for data analysis. No individual responses will be
reported or made available to anyone. Therefore, it is not
necessary to sign your name on your answer sheet.
Your frank, candid opinions are important and sincerely welcome.
Please read each guestion carefully before responding. Most can be
answered by simply choosing the number that most nearly represents
your opinion. The survey should take about 30 minutes to complete.
Your assistance in this effort is appreciated.
Please do not write on this questionnaire. An answer sheet has
been provided.
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A change in policy, procedures, or values may affect you personally
or may affect other members of your group, unit or organization
collectively. When a change is proposed, there are many factors
that influence one's attitudes toward accepting or rejecting that
change . Although we may comply with the change , we are sometimes
not initially or entirely committed to it.
Think about recent changes in your work environment . Listed below
are common reasons why people may resist change. In general, which
of the following do you believe are the most common reasons that
you initially may not be committed to a change or a proposed
change? Which of the following would have the least amount of
influence on your commitment?
Read through the factors listed in guestions 1-18. Then return
and evaluate each of the factors below by the relative importance
that you believe it plays in your decision to be committed, in
general, to a change or to a proposed change. Use the following
scale to rate the degree of influence the factor may have on your
decisions.
Individual importance to being personally committed to a change:
1 = Very low 2 = Low 3 = Moderate 4 = Fairly high 5 = High
1. Possible loss of job satisfaction (working conditions, pride,
responsibility, friends and important contacts)
2. Possible loss of money (bonuses lost, for example)
3. Possible loss of job security (authority, personal freedom,
status)
4. Possible loss of job stability (reguirement to change jobs
or PCS)
5. There is usually no need to change
6. In the short term, change will create more harm than good
7. In the long term, change will create more harm than good
8. Personal lack of respect for the person making the change
9. Personal lack of respect for the competence of the person
making the change
10. I am told what to do but not why
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Individual importance to being personally committed to a change:
1 = Very low 2 = Low 3 = Moderate 4 = Fairly high 5 = High
11. I may have negative attitudes toward the job, organization,
or my boss
12. I am not allowed input into the change effort
13. The change may be the result of someone's personal criticism
of my previous efforts
14. Change adds work, confusion, mistakes and other negative
results
15. Change reguires effort by all involved or affected
16. The change may be poorly timed
17. Change becomes an opportunity for others to challenge my
authority
18. I resent hearing about changes secondhand
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It is both natural and common for an individual to resist change
because they justifiably may fear the loss of something important
to them. Rate the following types of losses by the degree that it
might influence your initial commitment to a change or proposed
change in your work environment.
Degree to which the loss of this would influence my commitment to
a change ....
1 = Very low 2 = Low 3 = Moderate 4 = Fairly high 5 = High












The following statements attempt to identify your opinions of
specific management and leadership tools, methods and technigues
advocated by a particular change effort. The term "product" refers
to something that one produces , such as a report or operations
plan. The term "service" refers to something that one provides,
such as close air support or transportation. "Long term" refers to
changes that will last no less than five years into the future.
Evaluate each guestion guickly. Do not try to "read into" the
guestions . These guestions do not have a right or wrong answer.
They are your opinions! Answer each guestion on the following
scale.
Degree to which I agree/disagree with the following statement.




5 = Strongly disagree
29. In planning, it is the sole responsibility of higher
headguarters and staff sections to determine the needs and
reguirements of the product or service user and pass that
information to the appropriate levels within their command.
30. SNCOs within a command should be responsible for policy,
values, and the long term course for the organization.
31. Long term planning is effective at levels lower than the
commanding officer.
32. Long term planning should be made at levels lower than the
commanding officer.
33. Marine Corps policies and practices that reward short term
planning more than long term planning are necessary.
34. The nature of the Marine Corps' mission and training reguires
a dependence on short term planning over long term planning.
35. Everything is okay in the Marine Corps, so why change?
36. Although faced with reduced funding and manning levels, our
present course in the Marine Corps will allow a high degree of
readiness and mission accomplishment without major changes.
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Degree to which I agree/disagree with the following statement.




5 = Strongly disagree
37. I believe that the Marine Corps needs to make major
improvements in the way we operate
.
38. I believe that we should put more emphasis on improving the
quality of what we do than meeting budget (money) and schedules
(time required to meet specific objectives).
39. The Marine Corps is dependent on inspections to achieve
desired results.
40. Ceasing emphasis on individual performance inspections will
compromise safety or the quality of performance that we presently
observe.
41. Ceasing emphasis on unit inspections will compromise safety
or the quality of performance that we presently observe.
42. I need to inspect my subordinate's work to ensure that it is
of the highest quality.
43. The Marine Corps is as good as it can get.
44. My personal performance is always at my highest level of
capability.
45. Officers within a command should be responsible for policy,
values, and the long term course for the organization.
46. Lack of time (training time, personal time or other) is one
of the biggest if not the single biggest barrier to continuously
improving personal or unit performance.
47. Continuous improvements to quality of personal or unit
performance cost more time, money, or other resources.
48. The cost of continuous improvements to the quality of
personal or unit performance is usually more than the benefits
gained.
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Degree to which I agree/disagree with the following statement....




5 = Strongly disagree
49. One of a leader's most important jobs is to remove
organization/system barriers (people, policies, procedures, etc.)
that hinder efficiency and effectiveness.
50. It's too much effort to remove barriers that keep a unit from
being effective.
51. People above me create barriers that won't allow me to
improve
.
52. Current Marine Corps policies and procedures don't allow
enough latitude or freedom to improve my work.
53. Leadership by fear and force is intolerable.
54. Leadership by fear and force squanders our greatest resource,
our people.
55. There is no place for leadership by fear and force in the
Marine Corps.
56. Some Marines (officer and enlisted) need to be led by fear
and force in order to get them to perform to standard.
57. Team play within a unit is a primary requirement for
achieving mission accomplishment.
58. Personal or unit competition for awards (informal as well as
formal recognition) increases the quality of performance of all who
compete
59. Close supervision and/or formal inspections foster
communication and cooperation within a unit.
60. "Assistance visits" from higher headquarters or within a unit
foster communication and cooperation within a unit.
61. Slogans ("Safety is everyone's responsibility," for example)
significantly contribute to individual or unit performance.
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Degree to which I agree/disagree with the following statement....




5 = Strongly disagree
62. Most units rely heavily on slogans to motivate Marines to do
a better job.
63. Slogans motivate Marines to do a better job.
64. Slogans that come from a unit's leadership tend to have
little or no affect on the attitudes or performance of junior
Marines.
65. Technical manual (TM) work standards are reliable estimates
of how long a job should take.
66. Marine technicians that cannot meet TM work standards usually
lack experience, knowledge or motivation.
67. Eliminating work standards causes confusion or the need for
increased supervision.
68. NCOs receive adequate leadership training for their
particular rank and responsibility.
69. Officers receive adequate leadership training for their
particular rank and responsibility.
70. Most officers and SNCOs have the opportunity to participate
in the same small group or unit training that has been scheduled
for their units.
71. Present Marine Corps' leadership fundamentals can get us
through all situations.
72. A good leader is one who sets up a system, directs the work
through subordinates.
73. A good leader develops a basis to set standards of
performance for his subordinates.




Degree to which I agree/disagree with the following statement.




5 = Strongly disagree
75. A good leader rates subordinate performance against these
targets
.
76. Continuing MOS training for all Marines should be among the
foremost concerns of unit leadership.
77. The Marine Corps should invest more time and money in MOS
training for personnel.
78. Marines generally feel that they have received the proper
amount of MOS skill training to be successful in their jobs.
79. I feel that I have received the proper amount of MOS training
to be successful in my job.
80. Quantitative methods (basing decisions on numbers gained
through different measurement techniques vice opinions or
experience) should be taught at all levels.
81. Quantitative methods should be used as a primary factor in
daily decision making at all levels.
82. Continuing education (warf ighting, college, other outside
education) for all Marines should be among the foremost concerns of
unit leadership.
83. The Marine Corps should invest more money in educating
(warfighting, college, etc.) personnel.
84. I feel that I have received the proper amount of education
to be successful in my job.
85. I feel that emphasizing outside education for all ranks will
improve individual performance and unit readiness.
86. "Do not tell Marines how to do something, just tell them what
you want done." Marines are experienced enough to figure out how
to accomplish the desired outcome.
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Degree to which I agree/disagree with the following statement,




5 = Strongly disagree
87. Leaders should not work directly with their subordinates on
the process, the how and the why unless their subordinates seek
assistance. They should only supervise.
88. Officers should include SNCOs in formulating policy, values,
and the long term course for the organization.
100
The last set of questions is needed to help us with the statistical
analysis of the data. This information will allow for comparison
with other Marine groups. No attempt will be made to identify your
individual responses in this or any other part of the survey.







90. What is your highest level of education?




5. PhD or JD
91. How many different commands or assignments have you been




4 More than 6
92. Although for earlier purposes "long term" was defined, in
your most recent assignment, what would you consider an appropriate





5. 48 months and beyond




94. Have you ever served on a general's staff, or directly








96. What is your gender?
1. Male
2. Female





4. 10 - 15
5. More than 15
Please be sure that you answer each of the following guestions.







5 None of the above
99. (same guestion)
1. Master Sergeant/First Sergeant
2. Master Gunnery Sergeant/Sergeant Major
3 Second Lieutenant
4. First Lieutenant






5 None of the above









2. 11 or 13
3. 14, 15, 46, or 55
4. 18
5. None of the above
103. (same question)
1. 21, 23, or 65
2. 25, 26, or 28
3. 30
4. 31





4. 60, 61, 63, or 64
5. None of the above
105. (same question)








The following tables identify the survey sample by
demographic characteristic. Those observations that did not
identify their rank (2), were of ranks not specifically
targeted at the school the survey was administered (5), or
incorrectly coded a response to a particular question were
deleted.
Rank of Respondents
Total Percentaae of Sample
Staff Sergeant 107 32.33%
Captain 96 29.00%
Major 111 33.53%
Lieutenant Colonel 17 5.14%
Level of Education
Total Percentaae of Sample




Bachelor's degree 163 49.24%
Graduate degree 58 17.52%
PhD or JD 5 1.51%
Number of different commands or assignments
Total Percentaae of Sample1-2 11 3.32%3-4 64 19.34%5-6 103 31.12%
More than 6 151 45.62%
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Personal definition of "long-term"
Total3-9 months
9-15 months
15 - 24 months
24-48 months















Total Percentage of Sample
59 18.00%
271 82.00%
Served on General's staff
Yes
No
Total Percentage of Sample
107 32.33%
224 67.67%
USMC representative to the defense industry











Total Percentage of Sample





































































Scale - Part One
Individual importance to being personally committed to a change:
1 = Very low 2 = Low 3 = Moderate 4 = Fairly high 5 = High
Mean StDev Question
4.19 1.08 1. Possible loss of job satisfaction (working conditions, pride, responsibility, friends
and important contacts)
3.44 1.30 2. Possible loss of money (bonuses lost, for example)
4.02 1.14 3. Possible loss of job security (authority, personal freedom, status)
2.96 1.25 4. Possible loss of job stability (requirement to change jobs or PCS)
2.56 1.26 5. There is usually no need to change
2.74 1.23 6. In the short term, change will create more harm than good
2.89 1.47 7. In the long term, change will create more harm than good
2.98 1.30 8. Personal lack of respect for the person making the change
3.49 1.35 9. Personal lack of respect for the competence of the person making the change
3.60 1.29 10. I am told what to do but not why
2.86 1.12 11. I may have negative attitudes toward the job, organization, or my boss
3.73 1.16 12. I am not allowed input into the change effort
3.03 1.19 13. The change may be the result of someone's personal criticism of my previous efforts
2.98 1.34 14. Change adds work, confusion, mistakes and other negative results
3.23 1.43 15. Change requires effort by all involved or affected
3.33 1.14 16. The change may be poorly timed
2.41 1.25 17. Change becomes an opportunity for others to challenge my authority
3.58 1.37 18. I resent hearing about changes secondhand
Scale - Part Two
Degree to which the loss of this would influence my commitment to a change
—
1 = Very low 2 = Low 3 = Moderate 4 = Fairly high 5 = High
Mean StDev Question
4.16 1.16 19. Pride
3.64 1.21 20. Job stability
3.53 1.30 21. Honey
3.73 1.09 22. Personal freedom
4.19 0.98 23. Responsibility
3.89 1.03 24. Authority
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3.14 1.05 25. Working conditions
2.99 1.21 26. Friends
2.54 1.19 27. Ieportant contacts
3.02 1.24 28. Status
Scale - Part Three
Degree to which I agree/disagree with the following statement.








Point One: Create constancy of purpose for iaprovenent of product and service.
Mean StDev Question
3.76 1.28 29. In planning, it is the sole responsibility of higher headquarters and staff sections
to detenine the needs and reguirenents of the product or service user and pass that
inforuation to the appropriate levels within their connand.
3.15 1.28 30. SHCOs within a comand should be responsible for policy, values, and the long tern
course for the organization.
Long tem planning is effective at levels lower than the coraanding officer.
Long term planning should be nade at levels lower than the coananding officer.
Marine Corps policies and practices that reward short ten planning lore than long
tern planning are necessary.
2.47 1.25 45. Officers within a comnand should be responsible for policy, values, and the long tern
course for the organization.
1.72 0.91 88. Officers should include SNCOs in fornulating policy, values, and the long ten course
for the organization.
Point Two: Adopt the new philosophy.
Mean StDev Question
3.34 1.21 34. The nature of the Marine Corps' Mission and training requires a dependence on short
ten planning over long ten planning.
4.24 1.01 35. Everything is okay in the Marine Corps, so why change?
3.84 1.16 36. Although faced with reduced funding and Manning levels, our present course in the
Marine Corps will allow a high degree of readiness and Mission acconplishment without
najor changes.
2.55 1.13 37. I believe that the Marine Corps needs to Bake najor inproveuents in the way we
operate.
2.25 1.16 38. I believe that we should put sore eiphasis on inproving the quality of what we do
than Meeting budget (Money) and schedules (tine required to Meet specific
objectives).
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Point Three: Cease dependence on Bass inspection.
Mean StDev Question
2.95 1.26 39. The Marine Corps is dependent on inspections to achieve desired results.
2.87 1.14 40. Ceasing eaphasis on individual perfoniance inspections will coaproaise safety or the
quality of perforaance that we presently observe.
2.86 1.12 41. Ceasing eaphasis on unit inspections will coaproaise safety or the quality of
perforaance that we presently observe.
2.63 1.09 42. I need to inspect ay subordinate's work to ensure that it is of the highest quality.
Point Five: Iaprove constantly and forever the systea of production and service .
Mean StDev Question
4.31 0.86 43. The Marine Corps is as good as it can get.
2.91 1.14 44. My personal perforaance is always at ay highest level of capability.
2.43 1.27 46. Lack of tiae (training tiae, personal tiae or other) is one of the biggest if not
the single biggest barrier to continuously iaproving personal or unit perforaance.
2.89 1.18 47. Continuous iaproveaents to quality of personal or unit perforaance cost aore tiae,
aoney, or other resources.
3.85 0.98 48. The cost of continuous iaproveaents to the quality of personal or unit perforaance
is usually aore than the benefits gained.
Point Twelve: Reaove barriers to pride of workaanship.
Mean StDev Question
2.03 1.19 49. One of a leader's aost iaportant jobs is to reaove organization/system barriers
(people, policies, procedures, etc.) that hinder efficiency and effectiveness.
4.08 1.07 50. It's too auch effort to reaove barriers that keep a unit froa being effective.
3.11 1.15 51. People above ae create barriers that won't allow ae to iaprove.
3.28 1.08 52. Current Marine Corps policies and procedures don't allow enough latitude or freadon
to iaprove ay work.
Point Eight: Drive out fear.
Mean StDev Question
2.04 1.07 53. Leadership by fear and force is intolerable.
2.01 1.10 54. Leadership by fear and force squanders our greatest resource, our people.
2.66 1.25 55. There is no place for leadership by fear and force in the Marine Corps.
2.92 1.19 56. Soae Marines (officer and enlisted) need to be led by fear and force in order t><£
thea to perfora to standard.
Point Mine: Break down barriers between staff areas.
Mean StDev Question
1.62 0.83 57. Teaa play within a unit is a priaary requireaent for achieving aission
accoaplishaent.
2.29 1.13 58. Personal or unit coapetition for awards (inforaal as well as foraal recognition)
increases the quality of perforBance of all who coBpete.
3.34 1.03 59. Close supervision and/or foraal inspections foster coaaunication and cooperation
within a unit.
2.77 1.12 60. "Assistance visits" froa higher headquarters or within a unit foster coaaunication





Point Ten: Eliminate slogans, exhortations and targets for the work force .
Mean StDev Question
3.15 1.15 61. Slogans ("Safety is everyone's responsibility," for example) significantly contribute
to individual or unit performance.
Host units rely heavily on slogans to motivate Marines to do a better job.
Slogans motivate Marines to do a better job.
Slogans that come from a unit's leadership tend to have little or no affect on the
attitudes or performance of junior Marines.
Point Eleven: Eliminate numerical quotas.
Mean StDev Question
3.20 0.93 65. Technical manual (TM) work standards are reliable estimates of how long a job should
take.
2.98 0.99 66. Marine technicians that cannot meet TM work standards usually lack experience,
knowledge or motivation.
2.31 0.99 67. Eliminating work standards causes confusion or the need for increased supervision.
Point Seven: Institute leadership.
Mean StDev Question
3.56 1.13 68. NCOs receive adequate leadership training for their particular rank and
responsibility.
3.07 1.14 69. Officers receive adequate leadership training for their particular rank and
responsibility.
2.88 1.13 70. Most officers and SNCOs have the opportunity to participate in the same small group
or unit training that has been scheduled for their units.
Present Marine Corps' leadership fundamentals can get us through all situations.
A good leader is one who sets up a system, directs the work through subordinates.
A good leader develops a basis to set standards of performance for his subordinates.
A good leader sets goals and targets for mission accomplishment.
A good leader rates subordinate performance against these targets.
Point Six: Institute training.
Mean StDev Question
1.85 0.93 76. Continuing MOS training for all Marines should be among the foremost concerns of unit
leadership.
2.08 0.97 77. The Marine Corps should invest more time and money in MOS training for personnel.
3.28 1.00 78. Marines generally feel that they have received the proper amount of MOS skill
training to be successful in their jobs.
2.70 1.20 79. I feel that I have received the proper amount of MOS training to be successful in
my job.
3.41 1.03 80. Quantitative methods (basing decisions on numbers gained through different
measurement techniques vice opinions or experience) should be taught at all levels.








Point Thirteen: Institute a vigorous program of education and retraining.
Mean StDev Question
2.09 0.99 82. Continuing education (warfighting, college, other outside education) for all Marines
should be aiong the foremost concerns of unit leadership.
2.13 0.98 83. The Marine Corps should invest more money in educating (warfighting, college, etc.)
personnel.
2.63 1.12 84. I feel that I have received the proper amount of education to be successful in ay
job.
2.44 1.08 85. I feel that emphasizing outside education for all ranks will improve individual
performance and unit readiness.
Point Fourteen: Take action to accomplish the transformation.
Mean StDev Question
2.82 1.06 86. "Do not tell Marines how to do something, just tell them what you want done."
Marines are experienced enough to figure out how to accomplish the desired outcome.
3.02 1.16 87. Leaders should not work directly with their subordinates on the process, the how and




TABLE OF RANK BY Q30





Col Pet ] STRONGLY AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE STRONGLY]
] AGREE DISAGREE] Total
STAFF SERGEANT ] 34 31 24 11 7 ] 107
] 10.30 9.39 7.27 3.33 2.12 ] 32.42
] 31.78 28.97 22.43 10.28 6.54 ]
] 80.95 44.93 36.36 10.78 13.73 ]
CAPTAIN ] 5 22 23 36 10 ] 96
] 1.52 " 6.67 6.97 10.91 3.03 ] 29.09
] 5.21 22.92 23.96 37.50 10.42 ]
] 11.90 31.88 34.85 35.29 19.61 ]
MAJOR ] 3 13 13 50 31 ] 110
] 0.91 3.94 3.94 15.15 9.39 ] 33.33
] 2.73 11.82 11.82 45.45 28.18 ]
] 7.14 18.84 19.70 49.02 60.78 ]
LIEUTENANT COL
]
o 3 6 5 3 ] 17
] 0.00 0.91 1.82 1.52 0.91 ] 5.15
] 0.00 17.65 35.29 29.41 17.65 ]
] 0.00 4.35 9.09 4.90 5.88 ]
Total 42 69 66 102 51 330
12.73 20.91 20.00 30.91 15.45 100.00
Statistic DF Value Prob
Chi-Square 12 1(12.540 0.000
Effective Sample S: .ze = 330 Free[uency His.sing = 1
Correlation Data
Correlat.ed Quest] on Cc>rrelatior i
Rank (to restxmse) Ccefficient Probability
Major 27 .1718 .076
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40. Ceasinq emphasis on individual performance inspections will compromise safety or the quality of




Col Pet ] STRONGLY] AGREE ] NEUTRAL DISAGREE STRONGLY]
] AGREE ] DISAGREE]
STAFF SERGEANT ] 24 ] 35 ] 18 22 8 ]
] 7.25 ] 10.57 ] 5.44 6.65 2.42 ]
] 22.43 ] 32.71 ] 16.82 20.56 7.48 ]
] 66.67 ] 31.25 ] 29.03 21.78 40.00 ]
--+ +- +- r i
CAPTAIN ] 6 ] 36 ] 22 30 2 ]
] 1-81 ] 10.88 ] 6.65 9.06 0.60 ]
] 6.25 ] 37.50 ] 22.92 31.25 2.08 ]
] 16.67 ] 32.14 ] 35.48 29.70 10.00 ]
MAJOR ] 6 ] 33 ] 19 43 10 ]
] 1-81 ] 9.97 ] 5.74 12.99 3.02 ]















o ]LIEUTENANT COL 3
] 0.00 ] 2.42 ] 0.91 1.81 0.00 ]
] 0.00 ] 47.06 ] 17.65 35.29 0.00 ]
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Col Pet ] STRONGLY AGREE ]NEUTRAL IDISAGREE STRONGLY]
jAGREE IDISAGREE]
STAFF SERGEANT ] 21 [ 44 9 | 29 1 4 ]
] 6.34 13.29 2.72 8.76 1.21 ]
] 19.63 | 41.12 8.41 | 27.10 3.74 ]
] 65.63 35.77 18.37 25.66 28.57 ]
CAPTAIN ] 5 37 17 | 32 5 ]
] 1.51 11.18 5.14 ] 9.67 1.51 ]
] 5.21 38.54 17.71 33.33 5.21 ]
] 15.63 30.08 34.69 28.32 35.71 ]
MAJOR ] 6 1 35 20 1 *5 1 5 ]
] 1.81 10.57 6.04 13.60 1.51 ]
] 5.41 31.53 18.02 40.54 4.50 ]
] 18.75 28.46 40.82 39.82 35.71 ]
LIEUTENANT COL ] o 7 3 7 ]
] 0.00 2.11 0.91 2.11 0.00 ]
] 0.00 41.18 17.65 41.18 0.00 ]




























Sample Size = 331
WARNING: 30* of the cells have expected counts less




(to response) Coefficient Probability
Staff Sergeant 3 .16381 .0918
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NEUTRAL DISAGREE ] STRONGLY]
DISAGREE] Total
STAFF SERGEANT ] 28 39 1 17 1 19 4 ] 107
] 8.46 11.78 5.14 5.74 1.21 ] 32.33
] 26.17 36.45 15.89 17.76 3.74 ]
] 62.22 29.77 25.00 25.68 30.77 ]
CAPTAIN ] 7 40 19 25 5 ] 96
] 2.11 12.08 5.74 7.55 1.51 ] 29.00
7.29 41.67 19.79 26.04 5.21 ]
] 15.56 30.53 27.94 33.78 38.46 ]
MAJOR ] 9 45 28 26 3 ] 111
] 2.72 13.60 8.46 7.85 0.91 ] 33.53
] 8.11 40.54 25.23 23.42 2.70 ]
] 20.00 34.35 41.18 35.14 23.08 ]
LIEUTENANT COL ] 1 7 4 4 1 ] 17
] 0.30 2.11 1.21 1.21 0.30 ] 5.14
] 5.88 41.18 23.53 23.53 5.88 ]
] 2.22 5.34 5.88 5.41 7.69 ]
-+
.1 +- +
Total 45 131 68 74 13 331
13.60 39.58 20.54 22.36 3.93 100.00
Statistic DF Value Prob
Chi-Square 12 23.933 0.021
Sample Size = 331
WARNING: 35S of the cells have expected counts less
than 5. Chi-Square lay not be a valid test.
Correlation Data
Correlated Question Correlation
Rank (to response) Coefficient Probability
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Col Pet ] STRONGLY AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE STRONGLY]
AGREE DISAGREE]
STAFF SERGEANT 18 46 15 21 7 ]
5.44 13.90 4.53 6.34 2.11 ]
16.82 42.99 14.02 19.63 6.54 ]
62.07 36.80 34.88 18.42 35.00 ]
-+- (. h h +
CAPTAIN 4 26 12 48 6 ]
1.21 7.85 3.63 14.50 1.81 ]
4.17 27.08 12.50 50.00 6.25
]
13.79 20.80 27.91 42.11 30.00 ]
MAJOR 7 48 12 38 1 6 ]
2.11 14.50 3.63 11.48 1.81 ]
6.31 43.24 10.81 34.23 5.41 ]
24.14 38.40 27.91 33.33 30.00
]
LIEUTENANT COL 5 4 7 1 ]
0.00 1.51 1.21 2.11 0.30 ]
0.00 29.41 23.53 41.18 5.88 ]
l
j






















Statistic DF Value Prob
Chi-Square 12 33.255 0.001
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58. Personal or unit competition for awards (informal as well as formal recognition) increases the




Col Pet ] STRONGLY AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE STRONGLY]
]AGREE [DISAGREE]
STAFF SERGEANT ] 47 41 6 1 9 1 4 ]
] 14.20 12.39 1.81 2.72 1.21 ]





CAPTAIN ] 14 14 19 7 ]
] 4.23 12.69 4.23 5.74 2.11 ]
] 14.58 43.75 14.58 19.79 7.29 ]
] 16.67 29.37 31.82 43.18 43.75 ]
MAJOR ] 20 53 19 1 16 3 ]
] 6.04 16.01 5.74 4.83 0.91 ]
] 18.02 47.75 17.12 14.41 2.70 ]
] 23.81 37.06 43.18 36.36 18.75 ]
-+ if 4 > h +
LIEUTENANT COL } 3 7 5 2 ]
] 0.91 2.11 1.51 0.00 0.60 ]
] 17.65 41.18 29.41 0.00 11.76 ]
] 3.57 4.90
'












143 44 44 16 331
43.20 13.29 13.29 4.83 100.00
Statistic DF Value Prob
Chi-Square 12 43.776 0.000
Sample Size = 331
WARNING: 251 of the cells have expected counts less
than 5. Chi-Square may not be a valid test.
Correlation Data
Correlated Question Correlation
Rank (to response) Coefficient Probability
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Col Pet ] STRONGLY]
] AGREE ]
AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE STRONGLY]
DISAGREE]
-+ +- h +
STAFF SERGEANT ] 16 ] 44 23 | 20 3 ]
] 4.85 ] 13.33 6.97 6.06 0.91 ]
] 15.09 ] 41.51 21.70 18.87 2.83 ]
] 43.24 ] 33.33 35.94 26.32 14.29 ]
CAPTAIN ] io ] 33 16 26 11 1
] 3.03 ] 10.00 4.85 7.88 3.33 ]
] 10.42 ] 34.38 16.67 27.08 11.46 ]
] 27.03 ] 25.00 25.00 34.21 52.38 ]
-+ +- ^ +
MAJOR ] io ] 51 22 22 6 ]
] 3.03 ] 15.45 6.67 6.67 1.82 ]
] 9.01 ] 45.95 19.82 19.82 5.41 ]
] 27.03 ] 38.64 34.38 28.95 28.57 ]
-+ +- A
f, +
LIEUTENANT COL ] 1 ] 4 3 8 1 ]
] 0.30 ] 1.21 0.91 2.42 0.30 ]
] 5.88 ] 23.53 17.65 47.06 5.88 ]










Total 37 132 64 76 21 330
11.21 40.00 19.39 23.03 6.36 100.00
Statistic DF Value Prob
Chi-Square 12 18.442 0.103
Effective Sample Size = 330 Frequency Missing = 1
Correlation Data
Correlated Question Correlation
Rank (to response) Coefficient Probability
Staff Sergeants 15 .25634 .0080
16 .18063 .0639
27 .17097 .0797





TABLE OF RANK BY Q80
80. Quantitative lethods (basing decisions on numbers gained through different measurement




Col Pet ] STRONGLY AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE STRONGLY]
]AGREE DISAGREE]
STAFF SERGEANT ] 9 15 42 29 11 ]
] 2.73 4.55 12.73 8.79 3.33 ]
] 8.49 14.15 39.62 27.36 10.38 ]
] 81.82 26.79 43.75 23.97 23.91 ]
CAPTAIN ] 1 16 25 40 14 ]
] 0.30 4.85 7.58 12.12 4.24 ]
] 1.04 16.67 26.04 41.67 14.58 ]
] 9.09 28.57 26.04 33.06 30.43 ]
MAJOR ] 1 22 25 44 19 ]
] 0.30 6.67 7.58 13.33 5.76 ]
] 0.90 19.82 22.52 39.64 17.12 ]
] 9.09 39.29 26.04 36.36 41.30 ]
LIEUTENANT COL ] o 3 4 8 2 ]
] 0.00 0.91 1.21 2.42 0.61 ]
] 0.00 17.65 23.53 47.06 11.76 ]










Total 11 56 96 121 46 330
3.33 16.97 29.09 36.67 13.94 100.00
Statistic DF Value Prob
Chi-Square 12 25.503 0.013
Effective Sample Size = 330 Frequency Hissing = 1
WARNING: 35% of the cells have expected counts less
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STAFF SERGEANT 15 ] 37 38 13 ]
] 0.91 4.55 ] 11.21 11.52 3.94 ]










] 0.30 1.52 ] 4.24 16.06 6.97 ]












] 0.00 2.42 ] 5.76 16.67 8.79 ]








2 ]LIEUTENANT COL 11
] 0.00 0.61 ] 0.61 3.33 0.61 ]
] 0.00 11.76 ] 11.76 64.71 11.76 ]
























Statistic DF Value Prob
Chi-Square 12 33.394 0.001
Effective Sample Size = 330 Frequency Hissing = 1
WARNING: 351 of the cells have expected counts less
than 5. Chi-Square nay not be a valid test.
Correlation Data
Correlated Question Correlation
Rank (to response) Coefficient Probability
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